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FALSE COMFORT AND IMPOSSIBLE PROMISES:  UNCERTAINTY, 
INFORMATION OVERLOAD, AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
Cynthia R. Farina* 
[The time will assuredly come] when every vital interest of the state will be 
merged in the all-absorbing question of who shall be the next President? 
  —Alexander Hamilton1 
Reasonable people might reasonably fear that contemporary 
American government has gotten out of control.  Even those who do 
not believe in a minimalist, night-watchman state justifiably worry that 
much U.S. policy making and implementation is now beyond the 
ability of even most politically engaged citizens to comprehend, let 
alone to assess on the merits and attribute to the appropriate institu-
tional actors.  In such a society, is it any longer possible to retain even 
an ideal conception of our collective civic identity as a government 
“of the people, by the people, [and] for the people”?2 
To this fundamentally important question, the unitary executive 
conception of the presidency emphatically answers “yes.”3  Its argu-
ment is essentially this:  the people can maintain control over the di-
rection and performance of the national regulatory state through 
 
 * Professor, Cornell Law School; Director, Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative.  I am indebted 
to participants in faculty workshops at Wake Forest Law School and University of Florida 
Levin College of Law, for helping me clarify my thinking about the ideas in this paper. 
 1 Quoted in 3 JOHN C. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AS TRACED IN THE WRITINGS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND OF HIS 
COTEMPORARIES 346–47 (1859) (emphasis omitted). 
 2 President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). 
 3 Scholarship in the unitary executive tradition is cited throughout this Essay, but the prin-
cipal works are:  Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23, 67 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s 
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes 
The Structural Constitution:  Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 
(1992); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1241–46 (1994).  Memoranda from the George W. Bush Administration Office of Legal 
Counsel contain some of the most emphatic recent statements of unitary executive the-
ory.  See infra notes 6 and 88. 
   Two other important articles advocate the unitary executive approach without accept-
ing that it is required as a matter of originalist constitutional interpretation:  Elena Ka-
gan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
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their ultimate representative, the President.  Article II4 vests him with 
the full federal executive authority.  All officials charged with imple-
menting federal statutes are therefore his agents.  Authorized to “take 
Care” that all federal laws “be faithfully executed,”5 he has the duty—
and hence the power—to direct and, if necessary, correct the deci-
sions of those agents.6  Unlike either the multi-member legislature or 
the collegial judiciary, his office is deliberately structured to focus re-
sponsibility and to foster resolute, purposeful and efficient action.  
Moreover, as the only official whose electoral constituency is nation-
wide, only he represents all Americans.  When he coordinates policy, 
establishes administrative priorities, and sets the goals and limits of 
regulatory solutions, he answers to the whole people rather than to 
the narrow factional interests of particular regions.  When he acts to 
secure our interests at home and abroad he, uniquely, reflects and 
embodies the mandate of the nation. 
This is a bold solution to the riddle of how a twenty-first century 
global superpower can be governed both democratically and effec-
tively.  When, in addition, scholars such as Steven Calabresi and 
Christopher Yoo not only trace unitary executive theory back to the 
original constitutional understanding but also discern two hundred 
years of conforming executive practice,7 they undergird the theory’s 
 
 4 “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”  
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 6 “Power follows responsibility” reasoning is a staple technique of unitary executive inter-
pretation.  See, e.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 
to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 4, 6 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at 
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law/files/march.14.memo.part1.pdf 
(arguing that “the Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility, and 
therefore the power, to protect the security of the United States,” and that the President 
has “complete discretion in exercising the Commander-in-Chief power”).  I argue else-
where that the converse reasoning–“responsibility follows power”—is a far more impor-
tant constitutional principle.  See Cynthia R. Farina, Presidential Virtue:  An Essay on 
Constitutional Culture and Constitutional Conscience (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). 
   A subset of unitary executive scholarship hesitates to recognize presidential power to 
direct specific regulatory outcomes, although it insists that the President can fire deci-
sionmakers who do not make the decision the President prefers.  See, e.g., Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It:  A 
Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 593, 597–98 (2010). 
 7 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008).  Earlier historical accounts included Cala-
bresi & Prakash, supra note 3; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 3; Lawson, supra note 3; 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701. 
   Challenges to the originalist case include:  David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based 
Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (2009); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of 
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audacity with authenticity.  In this Essay, I am less interested in debat-
ing the historical pedigree of unitary executive theory than in consid-
ering its remarkable ascendency over the last thirty years.  No longer 
just the credo of the Federalist Society and Reagan Republicans,8 it 
has attained mainstream constitutional status and won adherents 
across the political spectrum.9 
Those outside the legal academy might respond that the greater 
wonder than the striking success of unitary executive theory is that it 
has taken law so long to catch up with larger cultural phenomena.  
Over the last hundred years, Presidents of both parties have been ex-
ploiting the growing pervasiveness and immediacy of mass media 
communications to establish a highly personal representative rela-
tionship with citizens.  In the process, the presidency has been rede-
fined as the core of American government.  Speaking directly to the 
people, and enlisting their support in what thereby becomes the uni-
quely presidential enterprise of leading the country to safety and 
prosperity, modern Presidents have emerged as “the single head of 
the government and moral leader of the nation who speaks for and 
may be taken as equivalent to all the people.”10  In this “personal” (or 
“plebiscitary”) presidency,11 Congress and federal agencies recede to 
 
the Governed:  Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 1007–18 
(1997); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 
1346 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 
U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3; Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits 
of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259 (2009); Garrett Epps, The Ill-Made Prince:  A 
Modest Proposal for a New Article II (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1445643. 
 8 See Amanda Hollis-Brusky, The Federalist Society and the Unitary Executive:  An Epistemic Com-
munity at Work, (Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, 
Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1456598. 
 9 E.g., Kagan, supra note 3; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3.  Accounts of the unitary execu-
tive propensities of recent administrations include Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabre-
si & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 601 (2005) and Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Clinton Ad-
ministration (Jan. 17, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1329485. 
 10 BARBARA HINCKLEY, THE SYMBOLIC PRESIDENCY:  HOW PRESIDENTS PORTRAY THEMSELVES 
134 (1990) (analyzing presidential speeches from Truman to Reagan); see also MARY E. 
STUCKEY, THE PRESIDENT AS INTERPRETER-IN-CHIEF (1991) (studying presidential rhetoric 
and reaching similar conclusions).  Presidential scholar Lyn Ragsdale notes that the effort 
to emphasize the uniqueness of each President has itself become an institutional feature 
of the modern presidency.  See LYN RAGSDALE, VITAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY:  
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 170–71 (2009). 
 11 See, e.g., SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC:  NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
(2d ed. 1993); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT:  POWER INVESTED, PROMISE 
UNFULFILLED xi (1985); CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, PRESIDENCY BY PLEBISCITE:  THE REAGAN-
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supporting roles in the enterprise of democratic governance:  at best, 
they are sidekicks doing the actual work of implementing the Presi-
dent’s policy agenda.  At worst, they are rogues and obstructionists to 
achieving the people’s interests that the President will overcome with 
the people’s help.  Unitary executive theory (finally) provides the 
constitutional backstory for this ongoing political drama. 
Still, recognizing unitary executive theory as the inevitable, if be-
lated, legal apologia for the modern American presidency reframes 
the question, rather than resolving it:  what is the attraction of per-
sonal, President-centered government as now justified by unitary ex-
ecutive theory?  The President, in the cultural and the legal account, 
is an exceptionally faithful and beneficent representative of the peo-
ple.  Yet neither the contemporary process of presidential selection 
nor the observed behavior of voters, candidates, or Presidents cor-
roborates the story of a “Representative-in-Chief,” whose immunity 
from regionalism and special interest politics enables him, uniquely, 
to identify and further some higher will of the whole nation.  More-
over, the managerial claim that Presidents do—or could, if only our 
legal regime would acknowledge their full constitutional authority—
bring coherence, rationality, and accountability to the vast U.S. regu-
latory enterprise is unrealistic, if not completely implausible.  Lawyers 
should also recognize that this “Decider-in-Chief” story threatens the 
values of expertise and legality that have been foundations of the 
modern administrative state.12  Given all these improbabilities and 
contradictions, why is unitary executive theory, along with the larger 
socio-political phenomenon of President-centered government it le-
gitimizes, so appealing to the popular and scholarly imagination? 
Part I draws on cognitive, social, and political psychology to sug-
gest that the extreme cognitive and psychological demands made on 
citizens by modern life create particular susceptibility to a political 
and constitutional ideology organized around a potent and benefi-
cent leader, who champions the people’s interests in the face of in-
ternal obstacles and external dangers.  Part II, which considers the 
exaggerated representational and managerial claims made by this 
ideology, draws on the large body of relevant work in election studies, 
public administration, and political science to argue that very condi-
tions which make the personal, unitary executive presidency so ap-
pealing also, ironically, ensure that no President can be the leader it 
 
BUSH ERA IN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 24–25 (1993); JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE 
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987). 
 12 See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007). 
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promises.  Finally, the conclusion considers the post-2008 revisionism 
that is now interpreting the George W. Bush Presidency as a perver-
sion of unitary executive theory.  It warns against the reassuring con-
clusion that a peculiar conjunction of inept but ruthless leadership13 
and professional irresponsibility of epic proportions14 produced the 
excesses of that Administration.  Accurate as those assessments may 
be, the vital lesson for the future is that the capacity for extremism is 
inescapably part of the unitary executive presidency. 
I.  FALSE COMFORT 
[People] are guided by two chief motivations, the desire to make a good 
decision, and the desire to make an easy decision. 
  —Lau, Andersen, and Redlawsk, An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. 
Presidential Elections
15 
Modern American citizenship is hard on the human psyche.  The 
volume and breadth of social and economic policymaking under-
taken by the federal government on our behalf is breathtaking.  A re-
cent empirical study estimates that regulatory agencies annually issue 
600–800 notices asking for public comment on proposed rules, plus 
about 200 final rules that become effective without public comment.16  
These agency actions run the gamut from the monumental to the 
(relatively) trivial; they may implicate deeply contested value judg-
ments or involve resolution of mind-numbingly technical questions.  
In 2008 alone, the nearly 200 federal entities with rulemaking author-
ity finalized regulations on issues ranging from permissible levels of 
airborne lead17 to handling onions grown in South Texas.18  They es-
 
 13 E.g., Peter Bergen, How Bush Botched War on Terror, CNN.COM, Jan. 8, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/07/bergen.war.terror/index.html. 
 14 E.g., Peter M. Shane, Three Takes on the OLC Torture Memos, EXECUTIVE WATCH, Apr. 21, 
2009, http://executivewatch.net/2009/04/21/three-takes-on-the-olc-torture-memos/. 
 15 Richard R. Lau, David J. Andersen & David P. Redlawsk, An Exploration of Correct Voting in 
Recent U.S. Presidential Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 395, 397 (2008). 
 16 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking:  An Empirical Portrait of the Modern 
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 931 (2008); see also Jason Webb Yackee & Susan 
Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and  Bureaucratic Performance:  Is Federal Rulemaking 
“Ossified”? 12, 32 (Univ. Wis. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1079, 2009), 
available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1371588 (estimating 
average of 720 notice-and-comment rulemakings per year based on Unified Agenda). 
 17 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,964 (Nov. 12, 2008) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.12). 
 18 Onions Grown in South Texas, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,973 (Feb. 29, 2008) (codified at 7 C.F.R. 
§ 959). 
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tablished compensation levels for “bumping” airline passengers,19 set 
maximum hours of driving for commercial truckers,20 defined infla-
tion adjustments for immigration law violation penalties,21 and speci-
fied minimum square footage of indoor and outdoor space for home 
child-care providers serving Head Start children.22 
The scale of federal policymaking is often incomprehensible to 
citizens.  A single policy initiative, the bailout of financial institutions, 
is estimated to cost two trillion dollars over its lifetime—a figure with 
no reality to most of us until it is rescaled to “ordinary” dimensions 
(e.g., the cost of giving $5,500 to every U.S. resident), at which point 
it becomes frightening.23  The geographical scope of U.S. interest and 
influence is literally global.  Countries about which the average per-
son knows little, if anything, suddenly emerge as objects of need that 
claim our financial and human resources, centers of conflict that re-
quire our soldiers, and sources of threat that imperil our societal and 
personal well-being. 
The Parts that follow examine how socio-political conditions of 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century America create an envi-
ronment in which citizens are especially susceptible to the simplify-
ing, palliating claims of the modern “personal” presidency and uni-
tary executive theory. 
 
 19 Oversales and Denied Boarding Compensation, 73 Fed. Reg. 21,026 (Apr. 18, 2008) (co-
dified at 14 C.F.R. § 250.8). 
 20 Hours of Service of Drivers, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,567 (Nov. 19, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R. 
§ 395). 
 21 Inflation Adjustment for Civil Monetary Penalties Under Sections 274A, 274B, and 274C 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,130 (Feb. 26, 2008) (codified at 
28 C.F.R. § 280.53). 
 22 Head Start Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 1285 (Jan. 8, 2008) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 1304, 
1306). 
 23 Oddly, “$2 trillion” featured frequently in discussions of events in the last quarter of 2008.  
In addition to being a conservative estimate of Federal Reserve Bank loans to troubled fi-
nancial institutions, Mark Pittman et al., Fed Defies Transparency Aim in Refusal to Disclose,, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=aatlky_cH.tY&refer=worldwide, it emerged as Nobel-prize winning econ-
omist Joseph Stiglitz’s estimate of the total cost of the Iraq war, Tom Regan, Report: Iraq 
War Costs Could Top $2 Trillion, CSMONITOR.COM, Jan. 10, 2006, available at 
http://www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/07/wf032807.htm, and the loss of Americans’ re-
tirement savings from the stock market’s prolonged slide, Nancy Trejos, Retiremet Savings 
Lose $2 Trillion in 15 Months, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2008, at A1. 
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A.  Future Shock and Cognitive Compensation 
The world of today . . . is as different from the world in which I was born as 
that world was from Julius Caesar’s.  I was born in the middle of human 
history, to date, roughly.  Almost as much has happened since I was born as 
happened before. 
  —Kenneth E. Boulding (1910–1993)24 
Attention is a finite and non-renewable resource. 
Whenever we search for and choose intentional investments, the acts of 
searching and choosing themselves require attentional investments. 
  —Thorngate’s First & Fifth Principles of the economics of attention25 
 
In 1970, sociologist Alvin Toffler speculated that people in mod-
ern industrial societies live under conditions of such intense expo-
sure to new information and accelerated rate of cultural change that 
they become vulnerable to a state of “future shock.”26  Rapid evolu-
tion of scientific knowledge, coupled with cumulating advances in 
communication, transportation, and other technologies, he argued, 
produce a state of sensory overstimulation, “information overload,” 
and “decision stress”: 
[T]he increased rate at which situations flow past us vastly complicates 
the entire structure of life, multiplying the number of roles we must play 
and the number of choices we are forced to make . . . .  
  Moreover, the speeded-up flow-through of situations demands much 
more work from the complex focusing mechanisms by which we shift our 
attention from one situation to another.  There is more switching back 
and forth, less time for extended, peaceful attention to one problem or 
situation at a time . . . . 
There is, however, still another, even more powerfully significant way 
in which the acceleration of change in society increases the difficulty of 
coping with life.  This stems from the fantastic intrusion of novelty, new-
ness into our existence . . . . 
The acceleration of change . . . radically alters the balance between 
novel and familiar situations.  Rising rates of change thus compel us not 
merely to cope with a faster flow, but with more and more situations to 
which previous personal experience does not apply.  And the psychologi-
cal implications of this simple fact . . . are nothing short of explosive.27 
 
 24 ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 15 (1970) (quoting Kenneth E. Boulding, The Prospects 
of Economic Abundance, Nobel Conference Lecture (1966)). 
 25 Warren Thorngate, On Paying Attention, in RECENT TRENDS IN THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
247 (W. Baker, L. Mos, H. Rappard & H. Stam eds., 1988). 
 26 TOFFLER, supra note 24. 
 27 Id. at 33. 
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These psychological implications, Toffler posited, include the 
feeling of being overwhelmed with the complexity of modern life; a 
perception of individual and collective loss of control; increased ten-
sion, self-doubt, and anxiousness; and “a deepening sense of confu-
sion and uncertainty.”28  He hypothesized that people try to avoid 
these disturbing mental states through a number of strategies:  at-
tempting to return to past modes of thought and action, individually 
or through a collective “politics of nostalgia” (reversion); 
“search[ing] for a unitary solution” or explanation (super-
simplification); and “flatly refus[ing] to take in new information” that 
further complicates decisions or calls into question existing beliefs 
(denial).29 
In the forty years since Future Shock was published, research has 
significantly advanced our understanding of human thinking and be-
havior.  Yet, the picture contemporary psychologists paint of cogni-
tion, motivation, and social interaction aligns surprisingly well with 
Toffler’s predictions. 
Cognitive psychology models the human brain as an information 
processor with a remarkable ability to conserve its own resources.  
Studies of attention and judgment reveal the brain making use of 
numerous strategies to stretch finite cognitive capacity; these strate-
gies allow rapid, almost reflexive, determination of which pieces of 
information ought be attended to, how the pieces fit together, and 
what they signify.30  Chief among the strategies are heuristics (simple, 
“fast and frugal” rules of thumb for making judgments31), schemata 
(mental models or scripts that organize our experience into generic 
patterns we use to interpret, and bridge gaps in, new information32), 
and prototypes (items which, by representing the “most typical” char-
 
 28 Id. at 322. 
 29 Id. at 319–21. 
 30 See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
 31 GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999).  “By ‘heuris-
tics,’ we mean problem-solving strategies (often employed automatically or uncon-
sciously), which serve to ‘keep the information processing demands of the task within 
bounds.’”  Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive 
Heuristics in Political Decision Making,  45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 952 (2001) (citation omit-
ted). 
 32 “For example, one’s schema about university professors might include the information 
that they are bookish, methodical, verbose, and badly-dressed.”  Patricia Pliner, Cognitive 
Schemas:  How Can We Use Them to Improve Children’s Acceptance of Diverse and Unfamiliar 
Foods?, 99 BRITISH J. NUTRITION S2, S2 (Supp. I 2008). The relationship between schemata 
and stereotyping is obvious. 
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acteristics that distinguish what is in a given category from what is 
not, provide a benchmark for categorizing new information). 
Social and political psychologists discern these same mental strat-
egies operating when individuals make choices about social behavior, 
group affiliation, and formation of political judgments.33  For exam-
ple, prototyping and the use of schema helps us differentiate and eva-
luate social groups and political candidates.34  Extensive reliance on 
heuristics is thought by some political scientists to explain how rela-
tively coherent mass public opinion can emerge from a nation of in-
dividuals who have little knowledge and less sophistication about po-
litical candidates and issues.35 
The human brain, in other words, works hard to manage incom-
ing stimuli in a way that avoids “information overload.”36  Attention is 
a limited resource,37 and if the brain is forced to process more infor-
mation than available cognitive capacity can manage, the individual 
experiences anxiety, fatigue, a sense of being overwhelmed, frustra-
tion, anger, increasingly poor decision making, depression, with-
drawal, feelings of panic, and, ultimately, complete inability to act.38  
Factors that contribute to the “cognitive load” of incoming informa-
tion include quantity, interrelatedness, complexity, novelty, ambigu-
 
 33 See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:  STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); POLITICIAL COGNITION:  THE 19TH ANNUAL 
CARNEGIE SYMPOSIUM ON COGNITION (Richard R. Lau & David O. Sears eds., 1986). 
 34 Michael A. Hogg, Uncertainty, Social Identity, and Ideology, 22 ADVANCES GROUP PROCESSES 
203, 207 (2005). “If the salient characteristics of a particular politician are consistent with 
or representative of the prototypic Republican, say, then voters may readily infer that she 
is for a strong defense, low taxes, against government intervention in the economy, 
against abortion, and so on . . . .”  Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 31, at 953. 
 35 For collection of the literature, see James N. Druckman, Does Political Information Matter?, 
22 POL. COMM. 515 (2005); Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 31.  This thesis is controverted.  
Lau and Redlawsk found that almost all voters use common political heuristics at times, 
and that such use is especially likely in situations of complex choice.  However, use of 
heuristics by politically unsophisticated voters actually reduces the likelihood that they will 
choose the candidate most closely reflecting their views.  Id.; see infra text accompanying 
notes 99–113.  For discussion of why this is so, see Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the De-
mocratic Idea, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413 (1998) (vigorously disputing the theory that heuristics 
enable meaningful democratic judgment by an uninformed citizenry). 
 36 Also called “cognitive overload,” “knowledge overload,” and “sensory overload.”  See Mar-
tin J. Eppler & Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of Information Overload:  A Review of Literature 
from Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related Disciplines, 20 INFO. SOC’Y 
325, 326 (2004). 
 37 E.g., Carol A. Heimer, Thinking About How To Avoid Thought:  Deep Norms, Shallow Rules, 
and the Structure of Attention, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 30, 30 (2008).  See also Thorngate, su-
pra note 25 (identifying six principles of “the economics of attention”). 
 38 E.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, The Concept of Information Overload:  A Preliminary Step in Un-
derstanding the Nature of a Harmful Information-Related Condition, 9 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 
259, 267 (2007). 
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ity, simultaneity, and intensity.39  As these factors cumulate, the un-
comfortable sensations associated with approaching the limits of 
cognitive and attentive capacities increase; this, in turn, increases the 
value of cognitive strategies that reduce attentional and cognitive 
processing demands.  Consciously or not, individuals under condi-
tions of information overload gravitate toward ways of thinking that 
simplify issues, narrow the range of acceptable choices, and delegate 
decisional responsibility to someone perceived to have power or 
competence.40 
At the collective level, this phenomenon can increase the attrac-
tiveness of certain types of groups and belief systems.  When people 
perceive that they cannot know, or understand, all the information 
necessary to be confident of making the right decision about some-
thing that matters to them, the result is a psychologically uncomfort-
able state of uncertainty.41  Social psychologist Michael Hogg ex-
plains: 
People strive to reduce feelings of uncertainty, particularly uncertainty 
about and related to themselves, and about their social world and their 
place within it . . . . Some uncertainty is exciting, making us feel edgy and 
alive, but for most of us most of the time acute uncertainty, enduring un-
certainty, and uncertainty about and related to self in social context is 
aversive.42 
People can reduce such uncertainty by affiliating with a group 
that defines the individual’s role and relationship to others, or by ad-
hering to a belief system (an “ideology”) that offers an integrated set 
of beliefs and values explaining the world and specifying appropriate 
individual and social action.43  Certain types of groups and belief sys-
 
 39 For an excellent synthesis of the literature, see Eppler & Mengis, supra note 36, at 330–33.  
See also John Sweller & Paul Chandler, Why Some Material Is Difficult to Learn, 12 
COGNITION & INSTRUCTION 185 (1994) (discussing problem in context of learning theory 
and instructional design). 
 40 See, e.g., Eppler & Mengis, supra note 36; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard 
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1226–29 (2003) (collecting 
literature on simplification and reduction of options); cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. 
Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999) (examining citizen use 
of unions, political parties, and corporations as political intermediaries to oversee and 
monitor government action). 
 41 See Janet A. Sniezek & Timothy Buckley, Becoming More or Less Uncertain, in INDIVIDUAL 
AND GROUP DECISIONMAKING:  CURRENT ISSUES 87, 88 (N. John Castellan, Jr. ed., 1993) 
(“subjective uncertainty” is the individual’s perception of inaccessibility of information, in 
contrast to “environmental uncertainty” which is the objective reality that information is 
unavailable). 
 42 Hogg, supra note 34, at 209. 
 43 Group affiliation “renders one’s own and others’ behavior predictable and thus allows 
one to avoid harm and plan effective action.  It also allows one to know how one should 
feel and behave.”  Id. at 210.  For an overview of studies demonstrating that uncertainty 
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tems are more capable of serving this function than others.  The 
greatest degree of uncertainty reduction is afforded by groups and 
ideologies that (i) define themselves through unambiguous, uncom-
promising boundaries; (ii) adopt a highly focused, internally consis-
tent set of beliefs and values; (iii) reject subtlety and contradiction in 
favor of a single, uncomplicated version of “the truth;” (iv) prize loy-
alty and conformity over individual critical judgment and initiative; 
and (v) offer a clear hierarchical structure, in which power is vested 
in a leader strongly associated with the group’s identity and trusted to 
determine its destiny.44  Appeals to authority and shared tradition of-
ten play an important part.45 
 
arising from social context makes people more likely to identify (or to identify strongly) 
with groups, see Michael A. Hogg, Subjective Uncertainty Reduction Through Self-
Categorization:  A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes, 11 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
223 (2000). 
 44 Michael A. Hogg et al., Uncertainty, Entitativity, and Group Identification, 43 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 135 (2007); see also Hogg, supra note 34, at 211–13 (citing 
additional sources). 
   On the importance of the group leader in times of uncertainty and crisis, see Daan 
van Knippenberg & Michael A. Hogg, A Social Identity Model of Leadership Effectiveness in Or-
ganizations, 25 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 243, 245–46 (2003).  Michael Hogg and 
Daan van Knippenberg review studies suggesting that under conditions of strong group 
identification, members will attribute status, support, capability, and persuasiveness to the 
most prototypical member of the group.  Social Identity and Leadership Processes in Groups, 
35 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Hogg & van Knippen-
berg, Social Identity].  “Attribution processes, specifically the fundamental attribution er-
ror, correspondence bias, or essentialism, operate to construct a charismatic and leader-
ship persona for the prototypical leader.”  Id. at 41; see also Michael A. Hogg, From 
Prototypicality to Power:  A Social Identity Analysis of Leadership, 18 ADVANCES GROUP 
PROCESSES 1, 1 (2001) [hereinafter Hogg, Prototypicality] (analyzing how “prototypical 
group members can become leaders”).  In other words, leaders whose attitudes, behav-
iors, etc. are seen as epitomizing the characteristics that separate “us” (in group) from 
“them” (out group) are perceived to be effective and so “acquire[] greater and more se-
cure leadership ability.”  Hogg & van Knippenberg, Social Identity, supra note 44, at 41. 
   For a broader discussion of these issues in the context of political leadership, see 
BARBARA KELLERMAN, BAD LEADERSHIP:  WHAT IT IS, HOW IT HAPPENS, WHY IT MATTERS 
22 (2004). 
 45 See Hogg, supra note 34, at 215–19 (discussing work on orthodoxy and authoritarianism).  
See also Michael A. Hogg, Uncertainty-Identity Theory, 39 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 69, 93–94 (2007) (describing work of “postmodern paradox” theorists, who ar-
gue that the contemporary “atomistic, individual-oriented status societ[ies]” which have 
replaced stable matrices of rank, familial, and social relationship give rise to a paradox in 
which “people with today’s less structured self yearn for community and the collective af-
filiations of times past”). 
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B.  Present Shock and Palliative Politics 
A weekday edition of The New York Times contains more information than 
the average person [in the seventeenth century] was likely to come across in 
a lifetime during seventeenth-century England. 
  —Richard Saul Wurman, in The Employee Handbook of New Work Habits for 
a Radically Changing World46 
Anyone with an Internet connection today has access to exponentially 
greater quantities of writing, images, sound, and video than anyone on earth 
could have imagined just twenty years ago. 
  —David A. Bell, The New Republic47 
Against this background, consider the environment in which uni-
tary executive theory has become a widely-endorsed and influential 
legal justification for the modern “personal” presidency. 
In the forty years since Future Shock was published, the volume, 
pace, novelty, complexity, and simultaneity of information has, if any-
thing, intensified.  In 2000, and again in 2003, researchers at the 
Berkeley School of Information Management and Systems estimated 
the volume of new information created annually.  Their findings48 
were mind-boggling: 
• Print, film, magnetic, and optical storage media produced about 
five exabytes of new information annually.  One exabyte (1018, or 
1 billion billion, bytes) is roughly the amount of information in 
seventy-seven novels—for every person on earth.  Five exabytes 
represents 37,000 times the information in the Library of Con-
gress’s book holdings—or all the words spoken by humans to 
date.49 
• Electronic media—telephone, radio, TV, and the Internet—
contained approximately 17.7 exabytes of new information (out 
of a much larger total information flow).50 
 
 46 Quoted in PRICE PRITCHETT, THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK OF NEW WORK HABITS FOR A 
RADICALLY CHANGING WORLD 21 (1994). 
 47 David A. Bell, The Colbert Report, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 2009, 
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/the-colbert-report, (reviewing JACOB SOLL, 
THE INFORMATION MASTER:  JEAN-BAPTISTE COLBERT’S SECRET STATE INTELLIGENCE 
SYSTEM (2009)). 
 48 UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY SCH. OF INFO. MGMT. & SYSTEMS, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? 
(2003), http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/
execsum.htm. 
 49 This, and the other equivalencies given here, appear on multiple websites including id. 
and The Digital Big Bang (Feb. 20, 2008), http://ideonexus.com/2008/02/20/the-
digital-big-bang/. 
 50 These estimates include audio and visual files, which are considerably larger than the 
equivalent information in text form.  Still, the quantities involved are so huge that they 
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When Toffler wrote, the extension of Internet access to the gen-
eral public through creation of the World Wide Web was barely on 
the horizon.51  In fewer than twenty years, the Web has exploded to 
63 billion pages that can be readily retrieved by commercial search 
engines;52 its total content is vastly larger.53  The Internet has brought 
e-mail, texting, Instant Message, Twitter, and YouTube—–media of 
such speed, immediacy, and accessibility that the increased informa-
tion load has profoundly altered our working and social lives.54 
The depth and scope of cultural change experienced by Ameri-
cans in the last four decades has been equally momentous.  Social, 
political, and technological developments have included:  the oil cri-
sis, recycling, and global warming; the women’s movement, the fight 
for gay rights, and the end of apartheid; personal computers, pocket 
calculators, and videogames; fiber optics, lasers, and nanotechnology; 
microwave ovens, cable TV, and VCRs; multinational corporations, al 
Qaeda, and the TSA; the discovery of black holes, the creation of the 
International Space Station, and the demotion of Pluto; facelifts, 
MRIs, and organ transplants; the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolu-
tion of the USSR, and the recognition of (mainland) China; FedEx, 
 
remain sobering even if adjusted down by several orders of magnitude.  For example, if 
the estimate of five exabytes, is reduced to five megabytes (i.e., from 1018 to 106), the 
amount of new information annually would still be equivalent to the text of Shakespeare’s 
complete works. 
 51 The World Wide Web dates from the early 1990s; the technology that evolved into the 
Internet developed from research in the early 1970s. 
 52 The Size of the World Wide Web, http://www.worldwidewebsize.com/ (last visited Jan. 
29, 2010).  Search engines construct a database of the Web by using programs called spi-
ders, or Web crawlers, that begin with a list of known Web pages.  The spider gets a copy 
of each page and indexes it, storing useful information that will let the page be quickly re-
trieved again later.  Any hyperlinks to new pages are added to the list of pages to be 
crawled.  Eventually all reachable pages are indexed, unless the spider runs out of time or 
disk space.  Surface Web, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface_Web (last visited Jan. 29, 
2010). 
 53 Indexed pages constitute the “surface Web.”  A 2001 study estimated that the “deep Web” 
is 1000 to 2000 times larger than “surface” content.  See Michael K. Bergman, The Deep 
Web:  Surfacing Hidden Value (2001), http://www.brightplanet.com/industry-
insight/white-papers/.  The deep Web can’t be reached for indexing by standard search 
engines in many cases because the web pages are generated on the fly (“dynamically”) by 
pulling content from databases or other locations in response to specific search requests.  
As this description implies, information in the deep Web is retrievable but not easily 
quantifiable.  Id. 
 54 A recent study estimates that the time and distraction involved in managing information 
generated through these electronic media occupies a substantial percentage of the work 
day of “knowledge workers” and costs the U.S. $900 billion annually in lost productivity.  
Julian Sanchez, Report:  Info Overload Costs $900 Billion, Blame Mr. Rogers (Dec. 30, 
2008), http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20081230-measuring-the-costs-of-info-
overload.html. 
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Polaroid, and Starbucks; the end of the Cold War, the beginning of 
the War on Drugs, and the declaration of the War on Terror; the 
Human Genome Project, stem cell research, and cloning; the Euro-
pean Union, NAFTA, and Microsoft; AIDS, anti-smoking campaigns, 
and anthrax threats; no-fault divorce, in vitro fertilization, and as-
sisted suicide; cell phones, camcorders, and MP3 players; disco, tech-
no, and emo; CNN, Dr. Ruth, and reality television; the Euro, bar-
coding, and GPS; Columbine and Oklahoma City, Katrina, and 9/11.  
That many of these developments are triumphs rather than tragedies 
is largely beside the point:  even “good” change creates stress if it is 
too swift and fundamental. 
In this cognitively demanding, rapidly shifting, frequently bewil-
dering, and increasingly threatening world, Americans maintain a 
complex and conflicted relationship with government.  We insist that 
public agencies and institutions should care for those in need, pro-
tect the environment, assure health care for all, police the safety of 
food, drugs, and other products, and defend our homes and bor-
ders.55  Yet, we believe that programs run by government tend to be 
wasteful and ineffective, and that regulation of business usually does 
more harm than good.56  We are convinced that voting gives us a 
voice in how government operates.57  At the same time, we doubt that 
government officials care what we think, and increasingly question 
the ability of the public to make wise political choices.58  As govern-
ment takes greater responsibility for our physical, social, and eco-
nomic well-being, we insist that greater transparency is the touch-
stone of democratic accountability.59  Yet, more information further 
 
 55 See, e.g., THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., TRENDS IN POLITICAL VALUES AND CORE ATTITUDES:  
1987–2007, at 12–19, 62–63 (2007), available at http://people-press.org/reports/
pdf/312.pdf; see also, Polling Report.com, Health Policy, http://www.pollingreport.com/
health.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (providing multi-year results of various polls on 
government provision of health insurance and food and product safety). 
 56 See THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 55, at 45–47. 
 57 See id. at 48 (“Roughly seven-in-ten Americans . . . agree with this statement:  ‘Voting gives 
people like me some say about how government runs things.’”); AM. NAT’L ELECTION 
STUDIES, THE ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR:  ELECTIONS 
MAKE THE GOVERNMENT PAY ATTENTION 1964–2004, http://www.electionstudies.org/
nesguide/toptable/tab5c_2.htm; AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, THE ANES GUIDE TO 
PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR:  GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS INDEX 1964–
2004, http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5c_3.htm. 
 58 See THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 55, at 45–50; AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, THE 
ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR:  PUBLIC OFFICIALS DON’T 
CARE WHAT PEOPLE THINK 1952–2004, http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/
toptable/tab5b_3.htm. 
 59 See, e.g., Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Executive Dep'ts 
and Agencies, Transparency and Open Gov’t (Jan. 21, 2009), available at  
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strains the already overtaxed attentional and cognitive processing re-
sources we need to comprehend what government is doing.60 
Numerous studies and polls reveal that contemporary Americans 
believe fervently in our system of government, while knowing little 
about the people and processes through which it operates.61  Al-
though this lack of civic understanding is often deplored,62 it is also 
not surprising.  The United States is the geographically largest and 
most heterogeneous democratic country in the world, and the struc-
tures through which it is governed are probably the most complicated 
and confusing of any contemporary democracy.63  We are committed 
to federalism.  This means that authority over economic, social, and 
personal affairs is dispersed across national, state, and local govern-
ment entities; the local level, closest to the people, itself comprises a 
byzantine jurisdictional tangle of counties, cities, townships, towns, 
villages, and school districts.  We are also committed to separation of 
powers.  This means that each of these levels typically has distinct leg-
islative, executive, and judicial bodies, the names and powers of 
which vary considerably.64  The administrative agencies, boards, and 
commissions also typically found at each level further multiply the 
number of governing entities able to make public policy and create 
rules with the force of law.  And, to complicate matters even further 
from the average citizen’s perspective, official entities at one level are 
required to obey, even enforce, the legal rules of higher-level entities, 
and so the “law” they announce to the public may be an amalgam of 
local, state, and national rules.  Finally, the scope and content of pol-
 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment/ 
(committing new Administration to “transparent,” “participatory,” and “collaborative” 
government). 
 60 The increasingly problematic relationship between transparency demands and democ-
ratic engagement is explored in Oren Perez, Complexity, Information Overload. and Online 
Deliberation, 5 I/S:  J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC. 43 (2009). 
 61 “The widespread ignorance of the general public about all but the most highly salient 
political events and actors is one of the best documented facts in all of the social sci-
ences. . . . Bare majorities know the simplest facts about how government works, and 
fewer still hold ‘real’ attitudes toward even the most important political issues of the day.”  
Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 31, at 951 (collecting sources) (citations omitted); see infra 
Part II. 
 62 E.g., Somin, supra note 35, at 416 (“[T]he fact that a majority of American voters with an 
opinion on the issue believe that the federal government is too large and powerful and 
simultaneously favor increased spending in almost every major area of federal involve-
ment” demonstrates the absence of the minimum knowledge required for meaningful 
democratic participation). 
 63 See Nelson W. Polsby, On the Distinctiveness of the American Political System, in ALAN BRINKLEY 
ET AL., NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS:  ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 29 (1997). 
 64 For example, in New York, “Supreme Court” denotes the trial courts of general jurisdic-
tion.  In Massachusetts, the “General Court” is the legislature. 
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icy measures no longer reliably match the level of the entity making 
them:  city councils, thinking globally and acting locally, ban the 
products of misbehaving foreign countries,65 while agencies of the na-
tional government specify the dimensions of curb ramps on village 
streets.66 
With the convoluted structures, overlapping powers, and diffused 
responsibility of this system, contrast the elegant simplicity, clarity, 
and logic of President-centered government under unitary executive 
theory.  A single leader possesses the responsibility and power to 
oversee modern regulatory government, coordinating, rationalizing, 
and correcting its myriad decisions.  Unique among public officials, 
he is elected by the entire country.  He is therefore attuned to the will 
of all, rather than beholden to the parochial demands of a few.  Con-
gress is inevitably torpid, conflicted, and erratic.  His office is inten-
tionally structured for swift, resolute, and purposeful action.  Legisla-
tors shirk personal responsibility, and administrators hide behind 
bureaucratic gibberish.  The personal President is readily identifiable, 
highly visible, and inescapably accountable to the people, who watch 
and listen as he leads the country and addresses the world.  Com-
mander of our armed forces, focal point of our intelligence gather-
ing, and head of a cadre of loyal and expert advisers, he commands 
the knowledge and the power of the nation. 
This account responds powerfully to the uncertainty and over-
whelming complexity of modern life.  Scholars of the presidency have 
long recognized that the modern President serves as an important 
cognitive aid for Americans;67 unitary executive theory supplies a co-
herent and compelling ideological framework for amplifying this ef-
fect.  The theory rejects the fuzzy contextual reasoning of checks-and-
balances for the certainty of roles fixed by separation of powers:  
“[the three vesting] clauses appear clearly to divide the world of gov-
ernmental powers into a finite set of three, . . . each of which is as-
signed to one and only one governmental actor.”68  It speaks in abso-
lutes:  “the Constitution unambiguously gives the President the power 
 
 65 E.g., Mary-Rose Abraham, Florida City Tries to Ban Chinese Products, ABC NEWS, Oct. 24, 
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/business/creativeconsumer/Story?id=3765361&page=1 
(describing how Palm Bay, Florida attempted to ban products made in China); John Ni-
chols, City Bans Sweatshop Products, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1997, at 14 (discussing the 
North Olmsted, Ohio ordinance banning municipal purchase of sweatshop products). 
 66 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. A, § 4.7 (2010). 
 67 See, e.g., Fred I. Greenstein, Popular Images of the President, in THE PRESIDENCY 287, 293–94, 
(Aaron Wildavsky ed., 1969). 
 68 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377, 
1390 n.45 (1994). 
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to control the execution of all federal laws.”69  It draws bright lines:  
the President’s “power to superintend, control, and ensure the faith-
ful execution of the laws” entails “the power to remove and direct all 
policymaking subordinates in the executive branch.”70  It establishes a 
leader with unique claims to authority that simultaneously legitimate 
his actions (“he, and he alone, speaks for the entire American peo-
ple”)71 and guarantee the beneficence of his judgments (“[Because] 
the national majority coalition. . . . will, by its very nature, be likely to 
be moderate, temperate, and just, so too will its agent be likely to be 
moderate, temperate, and just.”).72  It is authenticated by appeal to 
the wisdom of our ancestors, the plain meaning of our authoritative 
founding text, and the practice of our forefathers.73  No wonder that, 
over the last thirty years, unitary executive theory as apologia for the 
modern “personal presidency” has grown from a sectarian constitu-
tional creed to a mainstream civic religion. 
II.  IMPOSSIBLE PROMISES 
Leaders, even bad ones, can provide a sense of order and certainty in a 
disordered and uncertain world. 
  —Barbara Kellerman, Bad Leadership
74 
Overpromising is a danger at any time, but it is a particular danger now 
because the public mood is so unsettled. 
  —Peter McNamara, in Divided Government
75 
By emphasizing singularity over multiplicity, absolutism over con-
tingency, and established truth over emergent meaning, unitary ex-
ecutive theory displays the formal criteria of a particularly effective 
ideological resolution for the stress of modern civic uncertainty.  At 
the same time, its principal substantive claims respond directly to core 
anxieties about the contemporary American enterprise of self-
government.  The “democracy claim” assures us that we do continue 
 
 69 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 570. 
 70 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 7, at 29 (emphasis added). 
 71 Calabresi, supra note 3, at 36. 
 72 Calabresi, supra note 3, at 67; accord Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally 
Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1734 (2009) (“The Presi-
dent must answer to the entire nation and must consider all the effects and penumbras of 
executive actions.”). 
 73 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 74 KELLERMAN, supra note 44, at 22. 
 75 Peter McNamara, Doing One’s Job:  A Constitutional Principle and a Political Strategy for an 
Uncertain Future, in DIVIDED GOVERNMENT:  CHANGE, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 191, 207–08 (Peter F. Galderisi et al. eds., 1996). 
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to govern ourselves, even as our nation has become a global super-
power, because we choose our leader through a process that yields a 
representative of the “entire American people.”76  The “managerial 
claim” promises that this leader can supervise and control the vast 
federal domestic and foreign policy machinery that is largely beyond 
the ken of the normal citizen, aligning its outputs with the nation’s 
(our) interests. 
Yet, as the following Parts explain, President-centered government 
cannot deliver what it promises—in part because of the very circum-
stances of modern life that make unitary executive theory so deeply 
appealing.77 
A.  The Democracy Claim:  The President as Representative-in-Chief 
[P]eople now and always have wanted their President to be something bigger 
than life. 
  —Stephen Hess
78
 
Although the democracy claim is a key tenet of unitary executive 
theory, its proponents do not offer a single, completely specified 
model of exactly how the President comes to be the truest, best rep-
resentative of all the people of the nation.  Three possibilities are fair-
 
 76 Calabresi, supra note 3, at 36. 
 77 A small but determined literature has challenged the claims of unitary executive theory; 
in addition to historical critiques cited supra note 7, it includes:  Farina, supra note 7; Cyn-
thia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 227 (1998); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State:  Why a Unitary, 
Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827 
(1996); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 
AM. U. L. REV. 443 (1987); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Administrative Process in Crisis—The 
Example of Presidential Oversight of Agency Rulemaking, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 710 (1993); Pe-
ter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power:  A Constitutional Analysis, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596 (1989); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks 
and Balances:  The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995) [he-
reinafter Shane, Political Accountability]. 
   A more recent round of criticism of various aspects of unitary executive reasoning—
perhaps sparked by the prominence of the theory in Bush Administration decision mak-
ing includes:  Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1385 (2008); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration:  Rethinking Popular Represen-
tation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); Heidi Kitrosser, The Ac-
countable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741 (2009); Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist 
President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217 (2006); Kevin M. Stack, The Pres-
ident’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006); Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008).  See al-
so Thomas J. Cleary, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing:  The Unilateral Executive and the Separation of 
Powers, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 265 (2007). 
 78 Quoted in Alison Mitchell, Campaign Trail or Garden Path?, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at E5. 
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ly inferred from the literature defending President-centered govern-
ment: 
(1) Instructing our Representative:  This account of the representa-
tional rapport between President and people is the most straightfor-
ward—and the most democratically ambitious.  It envisions presiden-
tial elections operating as, in effect, national policy referenda.  
During the months of campaigning, voters engage in an extraordi-
nary period of nationwide reflection and debate on important do-
mestic and international issues.79  They then cast their ballots endors-
ing a particular policy agenda for the next four years.80  The 
victorious presidential candidate thus emerges with a genuine popu-
lar mandate to accomplish specific programmatic objectives. 
This account underlies the demand for enhanced presidential 
control over the content of domestic, as well as foreign, policy.81  It 
also can support the familiar political imagery of the President and 
the people working together to govern.82 
(2) Wise and Faithful Agent of the “National Majority Coalition”83:  A 
second, more democratically modest account, conceptualizes presi-
dential elections as quadrennial occasions for a nationwide coalition 
of interests, representing at least 51% of the people, to select its chief 
political agent.  This account does not depend on all (or even most) 
voters having a specific agenda of well-formed policy preferences.  
Rather, it sees the events that begin with the caucuses and primaries 
and culminate in the general election as a process wherein a majority 
of Americans discover the leader best suited (whether by character, 
 
 79 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 74; Steven G. Calabresi, “The Era of Big Government Is 
Over”, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1039 (1998) (reviewing  ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., supra note 
63). 
 80 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative 
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 508 (1985) (“Presidents are elected presumably because they 
share the policy preferences of a majority of citizens.”); cf. Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of 
Independent Agencies after Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779, 799 (arguing that inde-
pendent agencies “can frustrate [the] democratic process” because “[t]he President is 
elected precisely to implement those policies on which he has campaigned”). 
 81 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:  Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas 
of Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1193–95 
(1994). 
 82 Barbara Hinckley’s analysis of presidential speeches from Truman to Reagan, HINCKLEY, 
supra note 10, discovered a set of recurring political stories in Presidents’ public speeches.  
One of these is that the work of governing is “carried on primarily by the president, the 
American people, and the nation.” Id. at 131. 
 83 Calabresi, supra note 3, at 67; see also id.  (“[M]ost presidents . . . will work every day they 
are in office to try to keep their policies in accord with the wise and benevolent prefer-
ences of the national majority . . . .”). 
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political philosophy, experience, or substantive commitments) to re-
alize their political goals and act consistent with their political beliefs 
(however specified or general those might be). 
This account appears to be what fuels the strong unitary executive 
preference for presidential policy direction vis-à-vis that of Con-
gress—which appears by contrast to be an inferior democratic institu-
tion, affording representation that is necessarily limited and partial.84  
This account can also support the political imagery of the plebiscitary 
President speaking, uniquely, for the people of the nation.85 
(3) The Benevolent Dictator86:  In this third account, presidential 
elections are a device for conferring formal authority on a leader 
while incentivizing him to exercise this power for the general good 
rather than narrow factional interests.  This conception is the thin-
nest in democratic terms:  why people vote as they do is unimportant; 
no particular proportion of popular support is required, so long as 
the constitutionally specified process is followed.  The key is that se-
lection of the President requires participation of the whole nation.  
This attunes him to “the general national will” and leads him to resist 
factional demands for “policies at variance with those the nation as a 
whole might want.”87 
 
 84 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 36–38; cf. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2336 (arguing that 
political actors other than the President have “a far more tenuous connection to national 
majoritarian preferences and interests”). 
   One of the clearest articulations of this idea appears, remarkably, in a 1918 article by 
the Director of the Commercial University at Munich, Dr. M.J. Bonn.  In the article, Dr. 
Bonn attempted to explain the American political system to his countrymen, on the occa-
sion of the U.S. entering World War I: 
The President is the choice of the American people.  He is far more so than the 
Senate or the House of Representatives.  The Senate represents individual states.  
The members of the House represent particular electoral districts.  The President 
represents the whole nation, both minority and majority. . . . If the President tries 
to exercise an authority superior to that of the Senate and House, this is not a des-
potic maneuver.  His attitude is supported by a feeling that he alone is elected by 
the whole nation, which speaks in his name. 
  M.J. Bonn, A German Estimate of American Opinion, reprinted in 10 LIVING AGE 754, 757 
(1918), available at http://books.google.com/books? id=2wIuAAAAYAAJ&lpg
=PA754&ots=GMg44BGC0n&dq=Bonn%20%22A%20German%20Estimate%20of%20Am
erican%20opinion%22&pg=PA754#v=onepage&q=Bonn%20%22A%20German%20
Estimate%20of%20American%20opinion%22&f=true. 
 85 A second political story Professor Hinckley found in modern presidential speeches, see 
supra note 82, is that the President, the American people and the nation are one, “linked 
by the word ‘we,’ and . . . indistinguishable from one another.”  HINCKLEY, supra note 10, 
at 131. 
 86 This characterization may seem disparaging but it comes directly out of a text important 
to unitary executive theory, THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted at in-
fra text accompanying note 140. 
 87 Calabresi, supra note 3, at 64 n.105; see, e.g., Kagan, supra note 3, at 2335 (“[B]ecause the 
President has a national constituency, he is likely to consider . . . the preferences of the 
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This account permits the simultaneous insistence that the Presi-
dent is entitled to virtually complete autonomy and is uniquely moti-
vated to govern in the national interest.  No one can direct presiden-
tial judgment because the Constitution gives the executive power to 
the duly elected President alone.88  However, because he comes to 
power only on the vote of the whole nation, the President is moti-
vated to exercise power in ways that further the interests of the na-
tional community as a whole.89  This account also can support the po-
litical imagery of the “personal” President single-handedly carrying 
out the work of the government, often in the face of congressional 
irresponsibility and bureaucratic ineptitude.90 
 
general public, rather than merely parochial interests.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3, 
at 105–06 (“[B]ecause the President has a national constituency . . . [presidential control] 
appears to operate as an important counterweight to factional influence over administra-
tion.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Unitary Executive Interpretation:  A Comment, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 313, 320–21 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified 
Theory of Constitutional Law:  The Problem of Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 201 (1993) 
(both identifying the President as uniquely resistant to factional control). 
 88 E.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to William J. 
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and 
Taliban Detainees 14 (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/
documents/20020109.pdf (“[T]he president is vested with all of the federal executive 
power . . . .”); Online Discussion with Steven G. Calabresi, on WashingtonPost.com (June 
27, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/news/
article_full.cfm?eventid=3804) (“The executive power was understood as being quite 
broad in 1787, and it is given to the president.  Moreover, the Constitution says Congress 
can act only when both houses concur and the courts can act only when there is a case 
and controversy.  Anything the government does that does not involve bicameralism and 
presentment or adjudication of a case or controversy is executive and is in the president’s 
domain.”). 
   President George W. Bush expressed the idea most directly.  See Interview by Sir Da-
vid Frost with President George W. Bush (Nov. 16, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/frost/transcript.html (“I don’t pay attention to polls.”)); 
George W. Bush, News Conference (Mar. 21, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65409 (responding “Correct” to re-
porter’s question:  “You’ve said during your Presidency that you don’t pay that much at-
tention to the polls, but—”)); Bush:  “I’m the Decider” on Rumsfeld, CNN.COM, Apr. 18, 
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/18/rumsfeld/ (“I’m the decider, and I 
decide what is best.”); cf. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR:  INSIDE THE BUSH WHITE HOUSE 
145–46 (2002) (“I’m the commander—see, I don’t need to explain . . . . That’s the inter-
esting thing about being the president. . . . I don’t feel like I owe anybody an explana-
tion.”). 
 89 E.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 59 (emphasizing the President’s “unique claim to legiti-
macy” as the only representative “accountable to a national voting electorate and no one 
else”); id. at 36 (“The essential ingredient to combating the congressional collective ac-
tion problem is the President’s national voice, because he, and he alone, speaks for the 
entire American people.”). 
 90 The third story that, according to Professor Hinckley, pervades modern presidential pub-
lic rhetoric, see supra notes 82 & 85, is that Presidents work alone, with little help from 
Congress, advisers, or agency officials.  HINCKLEY, supra note 10, at 131. 
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These three accounts differ in the mechanism that produces a 
leader in singular rapport with the people of the nation, but each in-
sists that the President is the epitome of democratic representation.  
Each also resonates with particular aspects of the modern political 
phenomenon that is the “personal” plebiscitary presidency.  And, on 
closer examination, each rests on a simplified and idealized version 
of the American political process that is more mythic than real. 
1.  “Instructing our Representative” 
[T]he greater the size and scope of government, the more voters have to 
know if they are to control its policies through the ballot. 
  —Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Idea
91 
There is simultaneously too much information for any person to use 
competently, and most people are paying very little attention . . . . 
  —Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot 
Nominations
92
 
For presidential elections to function as occasions for citizens to 
specify the policy course of government, several conditions must ex-
ist:  (i) voters have a coherent collection of preferences on important 
policy issues; (ii) the slate of presidential contenders includes candi-
dates with clearly articulated policy agendas, at least one of which 
substantially coincides with voters’ preferences; and (iii) citizens suc-
cessfully vote their preferences, casting their ballots for the candidate 
whose policy agenda in fact most closely corresponds with their own.  
This is the story-book account of how representative democracy 
works.  Unfortunately, everything we know about voter and candidate 
behavior suggests that this story has little relation to what actually 
happens in presidential elections. 
We can begin with what appears the strongest case for conceptual-
izing presidential elections as national policy referenda:  the 1980s, 
which is, not coincidentally, the same political period in which uni-
tary executive theory emerged as a fully formed, coherent ideology.  
Three consecutive presidential campaigns offered voters well-defined 
and sharply contrasting visions of the appropriate role of the federal 
government in regulating business and providing social services.  And 
the people responded by giving decisive victories to Ronald Reagan 
twice (over incumbent Carter in 1980, then Mondale in 1984), and 
 
 91 Somin, supra note 35, at 431. 
 92 Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 
1533, 1544 (1999). 
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then to his Vice President and self-defined successor, George H.W. 
Bush (over Dukakis in 1988).  This all seems evidence of a nation of 
voters using the quadrennial ballot to endorse the Reagan Revolution 
of scaled-back domestic programs, increased military spending, free 
market economics, and social conservatism.93 
Yet the facts are otherwise.  Scholars of public opinion and voting 
behavior have repeatedly shown that most Americans in the 1980s did 
not support the new conservative agenda that included dismantling 
federal regulatory programs.  Surveys throughout the period solidly 
establish that a majority thought the federal government should be 
spending more on education, the environment, healthcare, and the 
poor.94  To be sure, the size of this majority was smaller in 1980 than at 
any previous time since the early 1950s.95  Significantly, however, the 
majoritarian preference for activist regulatory government began to 
grow steadily and markedly from the time Ronald Reagan was first 
elected.  By 1984, when Reagan was reelected by a larger popular vote 
than in 1980,96 the proportion of Americans voicing “liberal” regula-
tory policy preferences had risen to levels considerably higher than 
when Jimmy Carter won the presidency in 1976.97  By the 1988 elec-
tion of George H.W. Bush, this proportion had risen to about the lev-
 
 93 George H.W. Bush’s 1988 platform was so conspicuously framed as a continuation of Ro-
nald Reagan’s policies that 1988 has been called Reagan’s third election. 
 94 E.g., BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC:  FIFTY YEARS OF 
TRENDS IN AMERICANS’ POLICY PREFERENCES 169–70, 373–74 (1992); MARTIN P. 
WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS:  PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 
THE 1980S 101–10 (1991); Scott L. Althaus, Information Effects in Collective Preferences, 92 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 545 (1998). 
   See also David E. RePass, Searching for Voters Along the Liberal-Conservative Continuum:  
The Infrequent Ideologue and the Missing Middle, FORUM, June 2008, at 16, 45, 
http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol6/iss2/art5 (concluding from American National 
Elections Studies data, inter alia, that 1980 and 1984 victories did not reflect widespread 
voter support for Reagan’s new conservatism).  See generally, Christopher Ellis & James A. 
Stimson, Pathways to Ideology in American Politics:  The Operational-Symbolic “Paradox” 
Revisited, 3–4 (Apr. 7, 2005), available at www.unc.edu/~jstimson/Pathways.pdf (using da-
ta from 1970–2005 to show that Americans always on average “prefer policies through 
which the government does and spends more to solve social problems,” and that this 
“clear preference . . . . varies within a relatively small range, never quite touching the neu-
tral point even at its most extreme conservative moments”). 
 95 JAMES A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA:  MOODS, CYCLES, AND SWINGS 68 (2d ed. 
1999). 
 96 Both voter turnout and Reagan’s margin of victory were higher in 1984.  See Dave Liep’s 
Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1984 Presidential General Election Results, 
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1984&f=0&off=0&elect=0 (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
 97 STIMSON, supra note 95, at 68. 
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el of the 1964 election, when Lyndon Johnson and his proposed 
Great Society program beat Barry Goldwater in a landslide.98 
The 1980s are thus highly problematic for the “Instructing Our 
Representative” account of presidential electoral politics, but there is 
more.  Political scientists Richard Rau, David Anderson, and David 
Redlawsk used data from the 1972–2004 presidential elections to 
measure the extent of “correct voting.”99  They defined a vote as “cor-
rect” if it was cast for the candidate whose expressed issue positions 
most closely matched the voter’s collection of expressed, weighted 
preferences.100  Averaging all the elections in this thirty-two year pe-
riod, they found that “about one-quarter of all voters voted incorrectly, 
sending a misleading message about the direction of their prefer-
ences.”101 The range of “incorrect voting” in the period was set by two 
elections that seem particularly important to unitary executive claims:  
the highpoint of “incorrect” voting (49% of voters) came in the leg-
endary 1980 victory of Ronald Reagan over incumbent Jimmy Carter; 
the low point (15%) came in the notorious 2000 election, when Al 
Gore won the popular vote only to lose to George W. Bush in the 
Electoral College.102 
The Rau, Anderson, and Redlawsk study is the most extensive on 
issue voting in U.S. presidential elections, but its conclusions are con-
sistent with other, more time-limited studies.103  Whether we look at 
issues that have been politically salient for decades, issues that be-
come prominent in particular presidential campaigns, key political 
facts on which voter judgment depends, or simply background un-
derstanding of basic civics, crucial gaps and significant errors exist in 
voter knowledge.104  Presidential elections may be times of extraordi-
 
 98 Id.  Johnson made the Great Society programs the centerpiece of his domestic policy 
agenda in a speech given in the spring preceding the 1964 election. 
 99 Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk, supra note 15, at 396, 400. 
100 Drawing data from the long-running American National Election Studies (ANES) survey, 
the researchers constructed a measure using (i) information about voter preferences on 
specific issues; (ii) information from which relative weight of preferences (i.e., how im-
portant each policy issue was to the particular voter) could be gauged; and (iii) informa-
tion about candidate positions on the issues.  Id. at 396–97. 
101 Id. at 406 (emphasis added). 
102 Id. at 401. 
103 E.g., Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss:  How Political Ignorance Threatens Democracy, 
POL’Y ANALYSIS (Cato Institute), Sept. 22, 2004, at 2, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-525es.html (reviewing “the overwhelming evidence 
that the American electorate fails to meet even minimal criteria for adequate voter know-
ledge” on specific issues in 2004 election and on general political knowledge). 
104 For example, deregulation and decreased national government spending were promi-
nent and consistent themes of Ronald Reagan’s campaigns and presidency.  Yet, when 
the 1988 ANES asked about the pattern of federal spending on the environment, the 
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nary national political engagement, but a large proportion of voters 
still do not know enough to vote their preferences accurately.105 
From the cognitive perspective, this all makes sense.  The federal 
policy agenda is wide-ranging, the “facts” about individual issues are 
often not only complex but controverted, and the various proposed 
solutions frequently involve complicated interdependencies and 
trade-offs among incommensurable values.  Candidates, whether 
from deliberate strategy or less-than-optimal personal communica-
tion skills, are often unclear about their policy positions.106  Mass me-
 
poor, and public schools during the Reagan Administration, fewer than 30% of respon-
dents knew that federal government effort and spending had decreased in all three cate-
gories; indeed, in the areas of public schools and environmental protection, more re-
spondents thought the level of federal activity had increased.  See MICHAEL X. DELLI 
CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 
263–64 (1996); WATTENBERG, supra note 94, at 124–25.  Of the remaining respondents, 
about half did not know, and half thought spending had remained stable.  See id. at 125–
26.  In the area of assistance to the poor, a smaller but still remarkable 20.4% thought 
federal spending had increased under Reagan.  Id. at 124–25.  Consistent with the gen-
eral pattern of public opinion discussed in the text, between 60% and 68% of respon-
dents (depending on the issue) stated that they would disapprove of decreased federal 
activity in these policy areas.  DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 104, at 263–64.  A large 
majority of those who favored increased federal efforts and accurately perceived the 
Reagan record voted against Bush; a large majority of those who favored increased federal 
efforts but inaccurately perceived the Reagan record voted for Bush.  Id. at 263–64. 
   For data from a more recent election, see Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Is-
sue Knowledge and Perceptions of Agreement in the 2004 Presidential General Election, 36 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 243 (2006) (using ANES data, voters’ knowledge of candidates’ is-
sue positions was higher than in 2000, but mistakes worked disproportionately to Bush’s 
benefit; more people agreed with Kerry’s actual issue positions than Bush’s positions on 
five of seven issues examined; controlling for gender, age, race, education, party identifi-
cation, and ideology, each candidate knowledge item answered correctly was associated 
with a 16.8% decrease in the odds of voting for Bush). 
   On public ignorance about the basic structure and processes of our government, see 
SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS:  OPINION SURVEYS 
AND THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2003); DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 104, 62–104; 
John A. Ferejohn, Information and the Electoral Process, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC 
PROCESSES 3, 3 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990) (“Nothing strikes the 
student of public opinion and democracy more forcefully than the paucity of information 
most people possess about politics.”). 
105 Political scientists have largely abandoned the simplistic account of presidential elections 
as national policy referenda that can be legitimately interpreted as issue mandates.  In the 
words of one prominent scholar in the area,  “[i]f voting-behavior scholarship were the 
Wild West, mandate would have been tarred and feathered, ridden out of town on a rail.”  
STIMSON, supra note 95, at 113. 
106 See, e.g., Ian McAllister, A War Too Far?  Bush, Iraq, and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election, 36 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 260 (2006) (examining how “priming”—providing information in 
ways that plays into voters’ use of heuristics and other cognitive shortcuts—helped the 
Bush Administration compensate for majority disapproval of Iraq war in months leading 
up to the November 2004 election); Paul Waldman & Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Rhetorical 
Convergence and Issue Knowledge in the 2000 Presidential Election, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 
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dia and the Internet have radically increased the amount of readily 
accessible relevant political information, but they have also increased 
the volume of irrelevant “noise” and created new challenges for as-
sessing information accuracy, completeness, and currency.107  Even if 
the only thing Americans did during presidential campaign cycles was 
think about politics—a state of affairs as undesirable as it is unlikely—
the attentive and processing capacities of most voters would likely be 
overloaded.  Some researchers have found evidence that many Amer-
icans do not adopt a systematic, consistent belief system that is either 
conservative or liberal.108  Such a schema provides a cognitive frame-
work within which to interpret political information efficiently; with-
out one, people find it more difficult to assess competing policy posi-
tions and develop stable, consistent political opinions.109  Other 
research has underscored that even knowledgeable citizens have dif-
ficulty voting their preferences as the political environment becomes 
more informationally complex.  Lau, Anderson, and Redlawsk found 
that the level of education corresponded positively with correct pres-
idential voting unless voting conditions proliferated the number of 
required choices—as, for example, when a large number of local ref-
erenda are presented in the same election as the presidential ballot.  
In such circumstances, the most educated voters were actually sub-
stantially less likely than the least educated voters to cast a “correct” 
vote for President.110 
Moreover, there is evidence that knowledgeable voters sometimes 
deliberately “sacrifice” their preferred position on one or more issues 
 
145 (2003) (concluding that rhetorical presentation of issues by both Bush and Gore in 
2000 contributed to extremely low public knowledge of candidates’ actual position, a sit-
uation that particularly damaged Gore since the voters did not recognize that his issue 
stands were actually more aligned than Bush’s with public opinion). 
107 Cf. Bruce W. Hardy, Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Kenneth Winneg, Wired to Fact:  The Role of 
the Internet in Identifying Deception During the 2004 U.S. Presidential Campaign, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNET POLITICS 131 (Andrew Chadwick & Philip N. Howard eds., 2009) 
(concluding that during the 2004 presidential campaign, citizens who used the Internet 
for political information had higher ability to distinguish deception from fact during the 
campaign). 
108 E.g., RePass, supra note 94. 
109 Id.  Other studies have found that among voters with the least political knowledge, even 
the most basic political heuristics (e.g., political party) do not help; in fact, such voters 
are likely to make more errors when they employ these heuristics.  See Lau, Anderson & 
Redlawsk, supra note 15, at 398, 404; Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 31. 
110 The researchers commented: “It is as though the most educated try to make sense of 
every different choice they have, but when there are too many choices they become over-
whelmed and cannot make a good decision in the presidential election (nor, presumably, 
on the referenda, although we have no data on this point).”  Lau, Anderson & Redlawsk, 
supra note 15, at 405. 
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when they cast their ballot.  Typically, such voters refuse to cross over 
to the candidate of the other party despite disagreeing with their par-
ty’s candidate on one or more issues important to them.111  That this 
happens is hardly surprising.  Given the very large number of policy 
issues potentially within the President’s sphere of influence, and the 
need to choose between only two (very rarely, three) serious con-
tenders, the real surprise would be if many reasonably informed vot-
ers could find a candidate whose bundle of policy positions corre-
sponds perfectly to their own set of issue preferences.  Such voters 
may respond “correctly” to imperfect options—i.e., they may choose 
the candidate whose location in a multiple issue space is closest to 
their weighted preferences.112  But the fact that they must select a 
candidate despite his position on one or more issues that matter to 
them is yet one more commonly observed fact of American political 
behavior that undermines the account of presidential elections as ex-
traordinary democratic moments, when citizens instruct their gov-
ernment on their desired policies by choosing a Representative-in-
Chief who mirrors their preferences.113 
 
111 For example, responses from the 1992 ANES revealed that 54% of Republicans and 31% 
of Democrats held positions on abortion that clearly conflicted with the announced posi-
tion of their party’s candidate.  See Alan I. Abramowitz, It’s Abortion, Stupid:  Policy Voting in 
the 1992 Presidential Election, 57 J. POL. 176, 179 (1995).  This conflict produced defections 
by 17% of Republicans and 6% of Democrats—percentages that reveal abortion as one of 
the very few policy issues that have been dispositively salient for an appreciable number of 
voters in recent decades.  Id.  Indeed, Professor Abramowitz’s analysis concluded that 
abortion had a stronger effect on candidate choice than any other specific policy issue in-
cluding the Gulf War.  Id. at 184–85.  More significant for present purposes, the vast ma-
jority of pro-choice Republicans and pro-life Democrats cast their vote for a candidate 
whose position on the issue they rejected. 
112 See Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, The Two Faces of Issue Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 78, 78–79 (1980). 
113 Steven Calabresi and Nicholas Terrell argue that being forced to prioritize one’s prefer-
ences and make tradeoffs is an affirmative advantage offered by presidential elections be-
cause “we ought not only care about what viewpoints get majority support but also how 
intensely those viewpoints are held.”  Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 72, at 1725.  Surely, 
though, this reasoning sensibly applies only for policy issues that have reasonably direct 
interdependencies.  If I believe that government should act more aggressively to clean up 
the environment and that abortion should be illegal in all cases, what useful information 
to my representative comes from forcing me to choose between these preferences—
unless one believes that responding to single-issue zealotry is the pathway to good gov-
ernment?  Cf. Carmines & Stimson, supra note 112 (finding that voters who vote based on 
“easy” issues—issues that are symbolic rather than technical, deal with policy ends rather 
than means, and have been salient on the political agenda for a long time—resemble the 
relatively unknowledgeable and unengaged non-issue voter more than the relatively po-
litically sophisticated “hard issue” voter).  Even with respect to preferences that appear 
more directly interdependent—e.g., I prefer less government spending and more aggres-
sive government protection of the environment—my choices will often be artificially con-
strained by the limited array of policy bundles offered by the candidates.  I may also pre-
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2.  “Faithful Agent of the National Majority Coalition” 
Presidential action thus becomes—in a symbolic sense—our action; a 
scattered, divided, uncertain people are made one and exercise their 
popular power through their surrogate. 
  —Bruce Miroff, in Rethinking the Presidency114 
This second account of how all the people are represented in 
President-centered government appears more promising, for it does 
not make the high demands on citizen attention and judgment re-
quired in the “Instructing Our Representative” account.  Rather, it 
relies on the democratic decision principle of majority rule:  the pre-
vailing presidential candidate is the one who can inspire the support 
of enough Americans to forge a national majority; after he is in of-
fice, he will work to remain responsive to a combination of individu-
als and groups “large enough to keep his approval rating above fifty-
one percent.”115  This account does not depend on voters having co-
herent, specific policy preferences that are accurately mapped onto 
unambiguously expressed, equally specific issue platforms offered by 
presidential contenders.  The representational rapport between Pres-
ident and people rests on the formation and cultivation of a nation-
wide majority coalition, members of which determine who is best 
suited to exercise power on their behalf, and then maintain or with-
draw their support as they assess his ongoing performance in office.  
The bases on which these judgments are made need not be consis-
tent, or even specifiable; the make-up of the coalition need not re-
main stable.  It is enough that a majority of Americans know what 
they want when they see it.  The invisible hand of the national de-
mocratic marketplace does the rest. 
But even this more modest account of presidential democracy 
founders on basic facts of contemporary presidential politics.  Most 
fundamentally, modern Presidents are not chosen by anything close 
 
fer significantly lower military and foreign aid spending (three possible, rationally coher-
ent policies), but discover that no candidate offers this policy triad.  This is one of the 
most fundamental logical criticisms of attempting to interpret presidential elections as is-
sue mandates.  See NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS:  
STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN POLITICS 263–64 (10th ed. 2000) (using non-
mathematical application of Arrow’s Theorem to show how “[i]t is possible for a candi-
date to get 100 percent of the votes and still have every voter opposed to most of the can-
didate’s policies, as well as having every one of those policies opposed by most of the vot-
ers”). 
114 Bruce Miroff, Monopolizing the Public Space:  The President as a Problem for Democratic Politics, 
in RETHINKING THE PRESIDENCY 218, 223 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1982). 
115 Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 72, at 1702. 
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to a majority of the country eligible to vote.  In recent decades, the 
successful candidate has won the presidency on the votes of, on aver-
age, fewer than 30% of adult Americans.  This is not some complicated 
artifact of the Electoral College system.116  It represents simple (and 
routinely ignored) math:  the reported popular vote must be adjusted 
by voter turnout, which has averaged 55.9% in the presidential elec-
tions since 1980.117  Doing the math requires some fairly significant 
readjustments in our thinking about presidential “majorities”:  the 
1980 “mandate” to Ronald Reagan was conferred by 27.5% of eligible 
Americans; in 1992, Bill Clinton defeated incumbent George H.W. 
Bush on the ballots of 25% of those who could vote; the controversial 
2000 victory to George W. Bush rested on 26% of potential voters; in 
the historic 2008 election, Barak Obama received the largest propor-
tion of popular support in more than forty years of presidential selec-
tion:  32.6%.118 
These figures cast a very different representational light on presi-
dential elections.  Still, we could accept the “agent of the national ma-
jority coalition” account, in substance at least, if we could be assured 
that those who vote are themselves a representative cross-section of 
eligible Americans.  Conventional political science wisdom was in-
deed that the preferences of presidential voters do not differ signifi-
cantly from those of nonvoters.  The benchmark study was Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone’s analysis of data from the 1972 presidential election, 
which concluded that the views of voters in the Nixon-McGovern race 
were “virtually a carbon copy” of the general population on a range 
 
116 The impact of that system on presidential representation is discussed in the next Part. 
117 This average uses the most generous calculation of turnout, removing noncitizens and 
felons disenfranchised by state law to include only those who could legally have voted.  See 
United States Elections Project, Voter Turnout, http://elections.gmu.edu/
voter_turnout.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).  Since 1980, both these categories have in-
creased, so that the “voting age population” is about 9% greater than the “voting eligible 
population.”  See Michael P. MacDonald, Every Eligible Voter Counts:  Correctly Measuring 
American Turnout Rates, BROOKINGS INST., Sept. 29, 2004, 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2004/0909elections_mcdonald.aspx. 
   Turnout rates in the U.S. tend to be among the lowest in industrialized democracies.  
See Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation:  Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 1 (1997).  The modern low point was 1996 (Clinton/Dole), in which only 51.7% of 
eligible Americans voted.  See United States Elections Project, supra. 
118 Reagan (1980):  50.7% of a 54.2% voter turnout; Clinton (1992):  43% of a 58.1% turn-
out; Obama: 52.9% of a 61.7% turnout.  Data on turnout come from the United States 
Elections Project, supra note 117.  Data on popular vote percentage come from HAROLD 
W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 2005–2006, at 
12–13 (2005) and Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Elections, http://uselectionatlas.org/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 29, 2010). 
386 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
of policy issues.119  Although other studies generally supported these 
results,120 the conclusion that voters and nonvoters have the same pol-
icy preferences seemed counter-intuitive at best, for it is well-
established that voters differ substantially from nonvoters on demo-
graphic dimensions that often have political significance:  younger 
Americans, people of color, the poor, those who are less well edu-
cated, and those who are unmarried are consistently and markedly 
underrepresented among those who cast a ballot.121  More recent 
work is far more skeptical of the conventional wisdom.  Studying data 
from the 1972–2004 national elections, Jan Leighley and Jonathan 
Nagler conclude that “after 1972, voters and non-voters differ signifi-
cantly on most issues relating to the role of government in redistribu-
tive policies. . . . [V]oters are substantially more conservative than 
non-voters on class-based issues.”122  Studies disaggregating national 
opinion at the state and local level have similarly concluded that sig-
nificant differences exist between the preferences of voters and non-
voters, typically skewed in a conservative direction.123  Part I reviewed 
 
119 RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 109 (1980). 
120 A 2001 review concluded that “[o]ne of the least contested conclusions in the study of 
political behavior is that voters’ political attitudes and policy positions are fairly represen-
tative of non-voters.”  Patrick Ellcessor & Jan E. Leighley, Voters, Non-Voters and Minority 
Representation, in REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY GROUPS IN THE U.S.:  IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 127 (Charles E. Menifield ed., 2001). 
121 See, e.g., Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Who Votes Now?  And Does it Matter? 5 
(Mar. 7, 2007), (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/
dept/politics/faculty/nagler/leighley_nagler_midwest2007.pdf); see also ZOLTAN L. 
HAJNAL, AMERICAN’S UNEVEN DEMOCRACY:  RACE, TURNOUT, AND REPRESENTATION IN CITY 
POLITICS (2009) (reviewing literature); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION 
IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004, at 2–3 (2006), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf (reporting substantially higher tur-
nout among older, married, well-educated, upper income, and non-Hispanic whites, as 
well as geographic differentials for the 2004 election). 
122 Leighley & Nagler, supra note 121, at 18.  The authors point out that some earlier studies 
did find evidence of policy preference differentials.  For example, Bennet and Resnick’s 
1990 study of data through 1988 found few voter/nonvoter differences on partisanship, 
ideology, and foreign policy, but discovered that nonvoters were “slightly more in favor of 
an increased government role in the domestic arena.  They are more likely to oppose cur-
tailing government spending for health and education services, and . . . to support gov-
ernment guarantees that everyone has a job and a good standard of living.”  Moreover, 
nonvoters were significantly more likely to favor spending on core domestic programs.  
Stephen Earl Bennett & David Resnick, The Implications of Nonvoting for Democracy in the 
United States, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 771, 789–93 (1990). 
123 See, e.g., HAJNAL, supra note 121, at 8 (focusing on local elections, to conclude that “low 
turnout results in losses in mayoral elections, less equitable racial and ethnic representa-
tion on city councils, and spending policies that are less in line with the preferences of 
racial and ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups”); Jean-François Godbout & 
Mathieu Turgeon, A Matter of Degree:  Policy Preferences and the Probability to Vote 1 
(Aug. 30, 2008), (unpublished manuscript, available from a link at 
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some of the profound social and cultural changes in the United 
States since the early 1970s; over that time, the population has be-
come more racially heterogeneous,124 disparities in economic well-
being have increased,125 and the proportion of married citizens has 
decreased while that of older Americans has increased.126  In the same 
period, the policy agenda of the federal government has become 
even more ambitious, as such major regulatory initiatives as environ-
mental, workplace, and consumer protection developed.  Our under-
standing of whether and how the preferences of nonvoters differ 
from those of voters is still far from perfect, but what we do know 
should make us deeply wary of attempts to translate the votes of less 
than a third of eligible Americans into the democratic talisman of a 
“national majority coalition.”127 
Finally, two other modern political phenomena seem relevant to 
the attempt to locate the President’s representational superiority in 
the support of a majority of the electorate.  The first is the post-World 
War II propensity of voters to saddle the President with a Congress 
controlled by the opposition party.  Few questions of American elec-
toral politics are more contentious than attempts to explain divided 
government.128  Some scholars perceive voters engaged in “policy bal-
 
http://sites.google.com/site/polgodbout/home/research) (finding “significant, con-
stant, and systematic difference in attitudes on a range of policy issues” and that “as the 
probability of voting increases, the likelihood of having conservative views increases”). 
124 The proportion of whites and African Americans has declined relative to Latinos and 
Asian-Americans.  Leighley & Nagler, supra note 122, at 2 (using 2000 Census data). 
125 Between 1967 and 2001, the proportion of aggregate income held by the richest fifth of 
the population increased from 43.8 to 50.1%; the proportion held by the poorest fifth 
decreased from 4% to 3.5%.  Id. at 2 (using 2000 Census data). 
126 Id. 
127 A more radical proponent of the national majority coalition account might insist that we 
should count only those citizens who actually exercise their right to choose their political 
agent.  Even if this redefinition of the President’s true representational constituency were 
accepted, it runs up against the disturbing frequency of modern Presidents who have 
been rejected by the majority of voters.  Since 1960, five Presidents have come into office 
on less than 50% of the popular vote:  Kennedy 1960 (49.7%); Nixon 1968 (43.4%); Clin-
ton 1992 (43.0%); Clinton 1996 (49.2%); Bush 2000 (47.9%).  By contrast, in the first six-
ty years of the twentieth century, only three elections produced non-majoritarian winners:  
Wilson 1912 (41.8%); Wilson 1916 (49.2%); Truman 1948 (49.5%).  Wholly apart from 
Electoral College effects, the presence of third party candidates can give us a President 
who falls substantially short of persuading a majority of voters that he is best suited to exer-
cise power on their behalf.  STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 118, at 18–20 tbls. 1–7. 
128 Important contributions in the vast literature include BARRY C. BURDEN & DAVID C. 
KIMBALL, WHY AMERICANS SPLIT THEIR TICKETS:  CAMPAIGNS, COMPETITION, AND DIVIDED 
GOVERNMENT (2002); RICHARD S. CONLEY, THE PRESIDENCY, CONGRESS, AND DIVIDED 
GOVERNMENT:  A POSTWAR ASSESSMENT (2003); MORRIS P. FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 
(1992); GARY C. JACOBSON, THE ELECTORAL ORIGINS OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT:  
COMPETITION IN U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS, 1946–1988, at 115 (1990); DIVIDED 
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ancing”129 or even “cognitive Madisonianism.”130  This latter view—that 
voters are, at least to some degree, hedging their representational 
bets and consciously dividing power—receives apparent support from 
several years of various survey evidence in which a substantial number 
of Americans insist the country is better off if the same party does not 
control both the presidency and Congress.131  A strong dissenting view 
insists that divided government is an unintentional consequence of 
particular electoral circumstances, including the shift from a party-
based system to candidate-centered politics, incumbency, and cam-
paign financing.132  Noting the generally low level of political sophisti-
cation, the non-intentionalist view questions whether people really 
understand or mean what the survey evidence seems to be saying.133  
 
GOVERNMENT:  CHANGE, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (Peter F. Gal-
derisi, Roberta Q. Herzberg & Peter McNamara eds., 1996) [hereinafter DIVIDED 
GOVERNMENT].  Good summaries of the major positions appear in Richard G. Niemi & 
Herbert F. Weisberg, Do Voters Prefer Divided Government?, in CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING 
BEHAVIOR 271 (Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg eds., 4th ed. 2001); David Hill, 
Stephen C. Craig & Elizabeth Christie, Separable Versus Nonseparable Preferences:  Citi-
zen Attitudes About Divided Government in the United States (Jan. 8, 2004) (unpub-
lished manuscript, available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67989_index.html). 
129 The basic idea is that voters use different considerations in voting for different types of 
offices.  E.g., FIORINA, supra note 128, at 65 (“Essentially, [the voters] have the Republi-
cans bake the economic pie (and protect it from marauding bears and other dangers), 
but allow the Democrats to divide it up.”); JACOBSON, supra note 128, at 113 (stating that 
the public sees Republicans as better at national defense and handling inflation). These 
explanations fit the national political scene better in the 1980s, when Republicans con-
trolled the presidency and Democrats the Congress, than the 1990s, when the pattern re-
versed, although variations have been suggested; see, e.g., Niemi & Weisberg, supra note 
128, at 276 (suggesting that voters might have needed Republican Presidents less once 
the Cold War ended). 
130 E.g., Michael S. Lewis-Beck & Richard Nadeau, Split-Ticket Voting:  The Effects of Cognitive 
Madisonianism, 66 J. POL. 97 (2004).  See Everett Carll Ladd, Public Opinion and the “Con-
gress Problem”, 100 PUB. INT. 57, 66–67 (1990) (coining the phrase, and suggesting “[t]he 
public wants to set the two parties’ views of government’s role in creative tension”). 
131 A version of the divided government question has been part of the ANES survey for many 
years.  Gallup has asked about divided government since at least 2000.  Lydia Saad, Sup-
port Up for Divided Government and Major Third Party, GALLUP, Sept. 14, 2006, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/24502/Support-Divided-Government-Major-Third-
Party.aspx (summarizing results from 2000–2006 of response to question:  “Do you think 
it is better for the country to have a President who comes from the same political party 
that controls Congress, (or do you think it is better) to have a President from one politi-
cal party and Congress controlled by another?”).  A number of other popular and scien-
tific polls have posed the question at various times. 
132 E.g., BURDEN & KIMBALL, supra note 128. 
133 E.g., Lee Sigelman, Paul J. Wahlbeck & Emmett H. Buell, Jr., Vote Choice and the Preference 
for Divided Government:  Lessons of 1992, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 879, 883 (1997) (concluding 
that people who express the divided government preference on the ANES survey were 
only slightly more likely than the typical voter to split their ballots); John R. Petrocik & 
Joseph Doherty, The Road to Divided Government:  Paved Without Intention, in DIVIDED 
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Still other researchers conclude that the survey data probably over-
state the strength of popular support for deliberately dividing power 
but that flawed measurement and data inadequacies prevent a con-
clusive understanding of public attitudes.134  Obviously, any conclu-
sion on the “meaning” of divided government is well beyond my 
scope here, but the relative infrequency with which the President gets 
from voters a predictably “cooperative” Congress is another salient 
aspect of national electoral politics that calls into question the sim-
plistic account of a majority coalition of Americans choosing the 
President as the one political agent who will reliably further their in-
terests. 
The second problematic phenomenon for this account is that 
modern Presidents in fact do not reliably manage to keep their poli-
cies attuned to the will of enough individuals and groups “to keep 
[their] approval rating above fifty-one percent.”135  The overall aver-
age approval rating for the presidencies of Richard Nixon, Gerald 
Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George W. Bush all fell below the 50% 
mark.136  Of the remaining Presidents over the last four decades, Ro-
nald Reagan and Bill Clinton managed to keep their overall average 
above 50%, but each had extended periods when considerably fewer 
than a majority of Americans approved of the job they were doing; 
only George H.W. Bush succeeded in keeping his approval rating 
above 50% overall, and for most periods of his presidency.137  These 
are not the patterns of a representative who sees himself as “the con-
 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 128 (finding non-sensible patterns in the survey responses and 
concluding that “[p]artisanship and situational rationalization” were more likely explana-
tions than “strategic vision”). 
134 See Hill, Craig & Christie, supra note 128. 
135 Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 72, at 1702. 
136 Presidential Approval Ratings—Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-Gallup-Historical-
Statistics-Trends.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).  Public approval response to President 
George W. Bush has been a topic of particular interest.  E.g., Richard A. Brody, The Ameri-
can People and President George W. Bush:  The Fall, the Rise and Fall Again, FORUM, June 2008 
(looking at approval polls from ten polling organizations to conclude that Bush was 
unique in the sustained weakness of his level of public support); Waldman & Jamieson, 
supra note 106, at 161 (suggesting that the rhetorical framing of the 2000 election, which 
produced widespread voter misperception of Bush’s policy agenda vote, fueled public 
approval problems from the outset). 
137 Graphs of the time series of Gallup poll data are helpfully collected at Wikipedia.  Wiki-
pedia, United States Presidential Approval, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
United_States_presidential_approval_rating (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).  President George 
H.W. Bush’s approval ratings topped 50% until a relatively short period during the last 
year of his Administration. 
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scious agent[ of] a national majority coalition.”138  The next Part dis-
cusses why the constitutional design of the presidency itself defeats 
such a conception. 
3.  The “Benevolent Dictator” Model 
[T]he rest of us ought to remember that the politics of winning and 
governing often collide. 
  —Robert Samuelson
139 
Neither the informational, attentional, and communication obsta-
cles to interpreting presidential election results as policy referenda, 
nor the multiple factors that undermine the claim of presidential ma-
joritarianism, might be fatal to the “democracy claim” of unitary ex-
ecutive theory if the President is the one representative reliably moti-
vated to act decisively for the national good and resist the distorting 
influence of faction.  Alexander Hamilton sketches the idea in Feder-
alist 70, one of the core texts of unitary executive theory: 
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good 
government.  It is essential to the protection of the community against 
foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the 
laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-
handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of 
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of 
ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.  Every man the least conversant in 
Roman history knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge 
in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dic-
tator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to 
the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose 
conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the inva-
sions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of 
Rome.140 
In the “Benevolent Dictator” account, the President is incentivized 
by the very structure of the office to make policy decisions that bene-
fit the whole rather than favoring any regional or interest-group part.  
 
138 Calabresi, supra note 3, at 67.  In making this point, I accept the terms of the argument as 
framed by unitary executive theorists.  My own view is that constitutionally appropriate 
representative behavior by the President falls in between using approval ratings as the 
measure of good public policy, and ignoring them. 
139 Robert Samuelson, A Vote for McBama, REAL CLEAR POL., June 11, 2008, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/06/vote_for_mcbama.html. 
140 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 421–22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
This Part is prominently featured in Professor Calabresi’s influential defense of the repre-
sentational superiority of the unitary executive President.  See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 
37–38. 
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The least democratically demanding explanation of why President-
centered government is representationally superior, it requires little 
more than that the President recognize the national identity of his 
constituency.141  No majority of citizens need vote for or continue to 
support the winning candidate; voters need have no particular un-
derstanding of the issues.  The quadrennial election identifies the 
one individual who, from the unique vantage point of responsibility 
to represent the nation, will deploy power in the interests of all.142  
This account is as close as it gets to representation without the peo-
ple. 
Yet even this thinnest of representational theories runs up against 
the facts.  Popular and scholarly opinion may be divided over wheth-
er the Electoral College system is one of the Framers’ best, or worst, 
political innovations,143 but what cannot be disputed is its success in 
focusing the attention of would-be Presidents on geography.  Because 
population is not evenly distributed across the country, any per-capita 
allocation of electors will make high-density regions presumptively 
most interesting to the candidate seeking electors.  California alone 
offers one-fifth of the crucial votes needed for victory—more than the 
15 electoral vote-poorest states combined.  New York, Texas, and Cali-
fornia, with about one-fourth of the nation’s population, represent 
44% of the magic 270 votes.144  The constitutional formula tried to 
mitigate such geographical inequities by giving low population states 
a boost:  electors are allocated on the basis of House plus Senate del-
egations.  However, high-population states regained the advantage by 
adopting the winner-take-all “unit rule,” which dangles an entire 
block of electors in front of presidential hopefuls.145  The result is a 
 
141 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 59 (asserting that the President’s “unique claim to le-
gitimacy” comes from his “being the only official who is accountable to a national voting 
electorate and no one else”). 
142 For discussion of the distinction unitary executive literature draws between “the general 
national will” and local, state, and national factional interests which advocate “policies at 
variance with those the nation as a whole might want,” see Farina, supra note 7, at 989–90, 
989 n.8 (citations omitted). 
143 Compare, e.g., ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION:  
THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM (1994), and Jeff Jacoby, The Brilliance of the Electoral 
College, BOSTON GLOBE, July 16, 2008, at A15, with, e.g., GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA (2004), and Bradford Plumer, The Indefensible 
Electoral College, MOTHER JONES, Oct. 8, 2004, http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2004/10/indefensible-electoral-college. 
144 See Federal Election Commission, Distribution of Electoral Votes, 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
145 Longley and Peirce’s influential study links this to Jacksonian democracy.  LAWRENCE D. 
LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 2000, at 106 (1999). 
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system in which some voters are, by virtue of their location, worth a 
great deal more to presidential contenders than others.146 
Whether or not presidential voters are rational well-informed ac-
tors, presidential candidates—and their campaign advisers—certainly 
are:  both anecdotal and empirical evidence confirm that campaign 
strategies are built around the geography of achieving 270 votes.147  
The precise nature of these strategies has been much debated and 
the strategies have evolved over time; here, once again, radical 
changes in the information and communications environment are 
having significant impact.  Initially, attention focused on the extent to 
which high-population states reliably received more than their fair 
share of candidate visits, advertising, and other resources.148  Then, 
the impact of political competitiveness was factored into the models 
constructed by elections researchers149—and, as several of the tradi-
tional electoral mega-states have been relegated to “safe” status (e.g., 
New York to Democrats, Texas to Republicans), candidates indeed 
have focused on the relatively small group of “battleground” states in 
which the outcome is doubtful.150  In the most recent elections, mass 
media communications and the ease with which information now can 
be collected, analyzed, and disseminated digitally, is enabling even 
more precise regional focusing:  comparatively cheap, easy polling 
 
146 See, e.g., Lawrence D. Longley & James D. Dana, Jr., New Empirical Estimates of the Biases of 
the Electoral College for the 1980s, 37 W. POL. Q. 157 (1984) (finding advantages in the 1980s 
to Hispanic, Jewish, urban, Far West, and Eastern voters, and disadvantages to voters in 
Mountain, Southern, and Midwestern states as well as to blue-collar, rural, and Black vot-
ers). 
147 Cf. Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk, supra note 15, at 404–05 (including in multivariate analy-
sis of “correct voting” the number of candidate visits and political ads in state, and finding 
that “[h]olding other variables [constant], this translates into an increased probability of 
a correct vote of about 12% in battleground states where both candidates are blanketing 
the airwaves with ads, compared to states that the candidates are largely ignoring”). 
148 E.g., Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis, The 3/2’s Rule in Presidential Campaigning, 68 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 113 (1974) (modeling disproportionate impact of large-state voters and 
finding predictive fit with actual candidate behavior); Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. 
Levesque & Peter C. Ordeshook, Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College, 69 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 141 (1975) (reexamining the Brams & Davis data; agreeing that Elec-
toral College affects campaign resource-allocation decisions, but concluding that strategic 
model is more complex and multi-factored). 
149 E.g., George Rabinowitz & Stuart Elaine MacDonald, The Power of the States in U.S. Presiden-
tial Elections, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65 (1986) (employing a “pivotal player” analysis that 
adjusts size for “political competitiveness” and concluding that California, Texas, Illinois, 
and Ohio are substantially more important in presidential elections than warranted by 
simply population). 
150 See David A. Hopkins & Darshan J. Goux, Repealing the Unit Rule?  Electoral Vote Alloca-
tion and Candidate Strategy (Apr. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/6/3/9/p266390_
index.html). 
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plus targeted cable media advertising and Internet-based campaign 
outreach allow candidates to identify communities and interests that 
could decide key states.151 
In sum, the constitutionally ordained method of selection itself as-
sures that presidential candidates will be fully attuned to regional po-
liticking, and modern information and communication technology 
has amplified this effect.  As one observer puts it, “a wise presidential 
campaign strategist sees the political map as the intersection of bat-
tleground states and media markets.”152  A subsidiary (but, in the pre-
sent context, especially important) consequence of most states’ 
adopting the unit rule for allocating their electors is that a plurality 
victory is as good as sweeping the state.  Thus, the rational candidate 
knows he need not appeal to a majority of a state’s voters, so long as 
he can assemble a coalition of interests large enough to allow him to 
beat his closet rival.153  With the growing ability to pinpoint the groups 
who can contribute to that coalition, and execute an outreach strat-
egy targeted specifically to them, the would-be President comes into 
office thoroughly enmeshed in interest-group politicking.154 
 
151 See DARON R. SHAW, THE RACE TO 270:  THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CAMPAIGN 
STRATEGIES OF 2000 AND 2004, at 61 (2006) (account, by elections researcher and adviser 
to Bush 2000 and 2004 campaigns, of how campaigns routinely “calculated the relative 
cost efficiency of advertising for each of the media markets within our list of battleground 
states;” this ranking drove media expenditures); see also Darshan J. Goux, A New Battle-
ground?  Media Perceptions and Political Reality in Presidential Elections, 1960–2004, at 
15–16 (Aug. 31 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/5/2/4/8/p152483_
index.html) (finding that candidates have targeted “key states” for many years, but noting 
that technology—including “household-by-household computer analyses, targeted cable 
media buys, and other technologies”—provides targeting opportunities earlier campaigns 
lacked). 
152 Michael John Burton, Book Review, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 511, 512 (2007) (reviewing SHAW, 
supra note 151). 
153 See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam’s 
Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 125–30 (2000) (discussing reasons why a candidate per-
ceives “a patchwork of potential interest coalitions, whose utility to him depends upon a 
combination of their geographical location and concentration, and their marginal value 
in assembling a plurality within the state”). 
154 The Bush 2000 and 2004 campaigns found that the “media buys” and other campaign 
activity that resulted from calculating the “relative cost efficiency” of putting resources in-
to the various “media markets” within their battleground states had a positive, often sig-
nificant impact on both vote share and voter perception of candidate favorability.  SHAW, 
supra note 151, at 137.  See also Daron R. Shaw, The Effect of TV Ads and Candidate Appear-
ances on Statewide Presidential Votes, 1988–96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 345 (1999) (finding 
evidence that candidate TV advertising and appearances from 1988, 1992, and 1996 cam-
paigns affected statewide preferences as well as the Electoral College vote). 
   The Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk study, supra note 15, determined that “correct” voting 
correlated positively with the more heavily presidential candidates campaigned in the 
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It would be an heroic assumption indeed to believe Presidents, 
once they take office, shed the regional sensitivities and interest-
group commitments that got them elected, as easily as a snake sheds a 
shabby and confining skin.  Anecdotal evidence certainly suggests 
that they, and their close advisers, are specially responsive to the indi-
viduals and groups who helped “deliver” the previous election, or 
might be crucial to winning the next one.155  Moreover, a growing 
body of modeling and empirical analyses confirms that Presidents 
tend to behave consistently with basic tenets of political economy.156  
Examination of use of the veto power,157 grantmaking by executive 
agencies,158 and other federal spending159 has found evidence that re-
 
state, presumably because this increases the amount of salient information available to 
voters. 
155 “You can’t beat an incumbent president.  Remember, he’s got a hundred billion dollars 
at his disposal to distribute back to local governments, and he can send that money any-
where he wants.  Everybody from Alabama to Alaska files for projects, and the administra-
tion decides which ones to approve.  In an election year, they go where the votes are.” 
  THOMAS P. O’NEILL, JR. & WILLIAM NOVAK, MAN OF THE HOUSE:  THE LIFE AND POLITICAL 
MEMOIRS OF SPEAKER TIP O’NEILL 326 (1987); see e.g., Joseph A. Pika, Interest Groups:  A 
Doubly Dynamic Relationship, in PRESIDENTIAL POLICYMAKING: AN END-OF-CENTURY 
ASSESSMENT 59 (Steven A. Shull ed., 1999); Joseph A. Pika, Interest Groups and the Executive:  
Presidential Intervention, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 298 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. 
Loomis eds., 1983). 
156 Under the incentive-based “battleground hypothesis,” Presidents favor states that are 
competitive between the parties, as a way to woo electoral votes in coming elections; un-
der the reward-based “presidential-support” hypothesis, Presidents steer spending to 
states that provided relatively large proportions of popular votes in the previous election 
to cement future support.  For an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature see 
Valentino Larcinese, Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the 
States:  The Impact of the President 68 J. POL. 447, 447–49 (2006); Andrew J. Taylor, The Presi-
dential Pork Barrel and the Conditioning Effect of Term, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 96 (2008). 
157 See Kevin B. Grier, Michael McDonald & Robert D. Tollison, Electoral Politics and the Execu-
tive Veto:  A Predictive Theory, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 427, 428 (1995) (finding “significant evi-
dence” that “presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators 
from . . . electorally crucial states” through a sample of bills from 1970–1988); see also No-
lan M. McCarty, Presidential Pork:  Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics, 94 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 117, 118 (2000) (challenging the “assumption of presidential universalism when 
applied to budgetary politics” and modeling how the veto can affect both overall level of 
spending and the distribution across political jurisdictions). 
158 E.g., Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments, 
41 ECON. INQUIRY 496 (2003) (examining data from 1991–1999 to show that nearly half 
of Federal Emergency Management Agency disaster relief is politically motivated, with 
states that are politically important to the President receiving a disproportionately large 
share of disaster declarations and expenditures). 
159 E.g., Larcinese, Rizzo & Testa, supra note 156 (using data from 1982–2000 to show a dis-
proportionate flow of federal funds to those states that heavily supported the President in 
the prior election and states with governors of the President’s party); Walter R. Mebane, 
Jr. & Gregory J. Wawro, Presidential Pork Barrel Politics (July 13, 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~wmebane/targeting.pdf) 
(finding that “presidents pursue strategies to target federal expenditures to local areas to 
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sources are allocated strategically to electorally crucial regions—as 
Bush Administration Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove put it, “asset de-
ployment.”160  Presidents, it seems, are not immune to the problem 
that plagues every other elected official:  reconciling the representa-
tional duty of even-handed public-regardingness with the political 
need to reward past, and secure future, support.  In this, as in most 
things having to do with the presidency, only the scale is different.  
For the President, the nation is his pork barrel. 
B.  The President as Manager-in-Chief:  The Good Government Claim 
What Presidents do every day is to make decisions that are mostly thrust 
upon them, the deadlines all too often outside their control, on options 
mostly framed by others, about issues crammed with technical complexities 
and uncertain outcomes. 
  —Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents
161 
The second promise of unitary executive theory is that strong 
presidential leadership will bring informed coordination and pur-
poseful efficiency to the unrestrained, chaotic sprawl of modern reg-
ulatory government.  As with the democracy claim, the management 
claim is an assertion of uniquely presidential capacity vis-à-vis the other 
branches.  Unitary executive theorists are wont to disparage congres-
sional oversight as not only erratic but also riddled with parochial and 
other narrow factional bias.162  Even judicial review of agency action 
comes under fire for intermeddling with presidential prerogatives, 
except to the extent that the court is protecting traditional property 
and liberty interests from regulatory depredations.163 
 
promote their goals of reelection and preservation of a policy legacy” using 1985–1988 
county-level data).  See also John Mark Hansen, Individuals, Institutions, and Public Prefer-
ences over Public Finance, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 513, 526 (1998) (using mid-1990s data to 
examine how different representative institutions reflect public preferences and conclud-
ing that “Electoral College mathematics works modestly to the advantage of defense 
spending”).  But see Taylor, supra note 156 (finding no presidential electoral effect in dis-
tribution of procurement spending). 
160 John Solomon, Alec MacGillis & Sarah Cohen, How Rove Harnessed Government for GOP 
Gains, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2007, at A1 (reporting an alleged strategy of “staging of offi-
cial announcements, high-visibility trips and declarations of federal grants” through the 
White House political affairs office “to ensure the maximum promotion of Bush’s reelec-
tion agenda and the Republicans in Congress who supported him”). 
161 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS:  THE POLITICS 
OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 209 (1990). 
162 E.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 34–36, 84–86; Easterbrook, supra note 87, at 318–19; Lessig 
& Sunstein, supra note 3, at 93–106. 
163 See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
781, 785–92 (2009) (discussing emergence of this interpretation of Article II as a limit on 
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This Hamiltonian “good government” claim about President-
centered government is distinct from the claim that the President 
should control regulatory policy because he alone represents all the 
people.  Ultimately, however, the two merge.  Few informed observers 
disagree that U.S. regulatory policy would benefit from coordinating 
related programs, rationalizing the exercise of overlapping statutory 
jurisdiction, minimizing conflicting regulatory requirements, and 
generally ensuring that agencies are working through problems in 
ways that most effectively deploy finite public and private resources.  
This sort of managerial rationality is not what fuels scholarly and po-
litical debates over the extent of presidential power.  The controversy 
comes, as we move into the realm of setting regulatory priorities, de-
termining how benefits, costs, and risks will be assessed, favoring (or 
disfavoring) certain regulatory objectives, and deciding whether and 
how resources will be allocated to enforcement.  In these areas, “bet-
ter” regulatory government becomes harder to define without refer-
ence to specific substantive preferences and political philosophies.  
Unitary executive’s managerial claim insists upon presidential control 
in these areas as well, building on the representational claim that the 
President’s policy agenda best expresses the people’s will and na-
tion’s interests.  In this way, the solution to how the people can mean-
ingfully be represented in modern regulatory government becomes 
inextricably intertwined with the promise that presidential direction 
means coordinated, efficient, and effective regulatory policy. 
1.  The Magnitude of the Task 
The President is the most overworked and underinformed decisionmaker in 
the American policymaking system. 
  —Rachlinksi & Farina, Cognitive Psychology & Optimal Government Design
164
 
Information is to decision making what fuel is to fire.  Too much or too little 
can be equally devastating. 
  —Review of Groupthink or Deadlock:  When Do Leaders Learn from their 
Advisors?
165
 
 
review of agency action); cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (de-
scribing statutory attempts to confer standing to challenge agency action on persons oth-
er than those who suffered the “invasion of a legally protected interest” as invading the 
President’s Article II power). 
164 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government De-
sign, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 601 (2002). 
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The impressive trappings of the office and the often deliberate 
cultivation of a larger-than-life presidential image166 tend to obscure 
an elemental fact:  the President faces the same cognitive challenges 
as the rest of us in managing information flows, prioritizing multiple 
demands for attention, and comprehending and analyzing novel sit-
uations.  More accurately, these demands are vastly more onerous, re-
lentless, and insistent on the President than on any other American—
and, perhaps, on any other individual on the planet.  He overlooks an 
issue universe that spans all substantive policy areas, extends to criti-
cal international as well as domestic problems, and presents an ex-
traordinary number of high stakes decision points.167 
What is entailed in “managing” U.S. regulatory policy?  At the 
formal level, thousands of statutes delegate regulatory power to hun-
dreds of administrative units with formal policymaking authority.168  
These are located in fifteen Cabinet departments, dozens of inde-
pendent commissions, and various other free-standing entities.  
These entities exercise their regulatory power through an array of 
procedural mechanisms.  The most important, and public, of these 
include:  promulgating regulations with the binding force of law 
(rulemaking); issuing “guidance” documents that state the agency’s 
interpretation of its statutes and rules and announce its policy on en-
forcement or other matters;169 adjudicating charges of regulatory vio-
 
165 Bryan W. Marshall, Book Review, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 251, 251 (2003) (reviewing  
PAUL A. KOWERT, GROUPTHINK OR DEADLOCK:  WHEN DO LEADERS LEARN FROM THEIR 
ADVISORS? (2002)). 
166 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
167 One of the best discussions of the complexity within which the modern President is em-
bedded appears in BRADLEY H. PATTERSON, JR., THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF:  INSIDE THE 
WEST WING AND BEYOND 9–21 (2000). 
168 Between 160 and 200 distinct regulatory entities have statutory authority to issue regula-
tions.  The White House E-Government Office regularly refers to “more than 160 rule-
making entities” with rulemaking authority, see, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS OF THE PRESIDENT’S E-GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES, FISCAL 
YEAR 2009, at 11 (2008) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/
egov_docs/FY09_Benefits_Report.pdf, but this count excludes many independent com-
missions.  The total number of federal entities with statutory missions is considerably lar-
ger than the number of entities with rulemaking authority.  See OFFICE OF THE FED. 
REGISTER NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
MANUAL 2008/2009, at 103–579, 657–65 (2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
gmanual/browse-gm-08.html. 
169 For example, the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration issues six dif-
ferent varieties of regulatory guidance:  Preambles, “generally applica-
ble . . . interpretations or policy statements,” guidance letters to specific individuals or en-
tities, “[o]ral [g]uidance [s]tatements by [s]enior [a]gency [o]fficials,” grant guidelines, 
and compliance guides.  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, About NHTSA, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.c9b5cf87605c4e5033ed6830343c
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lations; and resolving applications for permits, licenses, benefits, and 
grants.  Less public, but not necessarily less significant, exercises of 
authority include:  ruling on petitions for rulemaking and requests 
for enforcement action, setting enforcement priorities, and allocating 
budget resources among programs.  Although most agencies use 
most of these methods, cross-government harmonization of regula-
tory practices exists at only a fairly high level of generality.  Even in 
rulemaking—the most public, legally specified, and formally signifi-
cant exercise of regulatory authority—the terminology, procedural 
details, and information disclosure policies differ significantly from 
agency to agency.170 
Hence, the President attempting to manage regulatory govern-
ment looks out over a vast enterprise comprising a huge portfolio of 
economic, health, safety, and social issues, being acted upon by hun-
dreds of distinct entities composed of 2.1 million full-time civilian 
employees, and having distinctive internal structures and decision-
making processes and largely unstandardized operating procedures 
and information reporting practices.  This lack of uniformity, cou-
pled with a dearth of meaningful government-wide reporting re-
quirements, makes it difficult reliably to generate even basic meas-
ures of the amount of federal regulatory activity.171  The snapshot that 
follows therefore has an element of randomness (in, for example, 
which agencies are included and the time period of their data), but it 
gives at least an impressionistic sense of the magnitude of federal 
regulatory decision making to be “managed.”  For several items, a per 
 
44cc/.  See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
OMB BULL. NO. 07-02, FINAL BULLETIN FOR AGENCY GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES (2007), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf (describ-
ing the nature of, and variations in, agency guidance). 
170 This became apparent when the George W. Bush administration decided to build a gov-
ernment-wide online electronic rulemaking docket.  The rulemaking process is heavily 
regulated by statutory and judicial administrative law, as well as presidential executive or-
der.  So, one might expect a fair degree of standardization.  In fact, inter-agency variation 
has bedeviled efforts to create a cross-agency system with more than skeletal capabilities.  
See COMM. ON THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING, ACHIEVING THE 
POTENTIAL:  THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING 17–19 (2008), available at 
http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/documents/report-web-version.pdf. 
171 This fundamental data problem leads analysts to use the number of pages in the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) or the Federal Register as a proxy for quantum of federal reg-
ulation.  See, e.g., John W. Dawson, Regulation and the Macroeconomy, 60 KYKLOS 15, 16–17 
(2007) (reviewing studies).  For a rough sense of the amount of regulatory activity com-
pletely invisible to these measures, see the remarkable collection of resources on “admin-
istrative actions which are outside the scope of the CRF or [Federal Register]” maintained 
by the University of Virginia Library, Government Information Resources:  Administrative 
Decisions & Other Actions By Agency, http://www2.lib.virginia.edu/govtinfo/
fed_decisions_agency.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
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week average is included; this is an heuristic to make the problem of 
regulatory “information load” more concrete, rather than any sort of 
descriptive claim about the frequency or regularity of agency output. 
• New agency regulations promulgated annually:  3500–4000 (67–
77 per week).172  In the first 10.5 months of 2009, about 500 of 
these (11 per week) were considered important enough to be 
reviewed by the Office of Regulatory Information (OIRA) in the 
White House Office of Management & Budget (OMB).173  Of 
this subset, about 100 (2 per week) are “economically signifi-
cant” rules that require full OIRA review of costs, benefits, etc.174 
• Civilian full-time executive branch employees (FY2010 esti-
mate):  2.12 million175 
• Number of bureaus, divisions, units, and programs listed in the 
directory of the Department of Health & Human Services:  
more than 3000176 
• Interpretive rules/other guidance: 
o Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (HHS):  “thou-
sands” annually;177 
o FDA (2003):  105 (2 per week);178 
 
172 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND 
TRIBAL ENTITIES 7 (2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
costs_benefits/2008_draft_cb_report.pdf; John Ashlin et al., Regulations.gov Federal Regula-
tory Portal, 30 J. GOV’T INFO. 81, 82 (2004). 
173 See RegInfo.gov EO Review Counts, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eoCountsSearchInit?action=init (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).  The numbers reported here 
are obtained by running the search with dates January 1, 2009 and November 15, 2009.  
Totals during the George W. Bush Administrations ranged from a low of 583 (in 2000) to 
a high of 715 (in 2003). 
174 Id.  “Economically significant” rules are those that “[h]ave an annual effect on the econ-
omy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of 
the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or 
State, local, or tribal governments or communities.”  Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 2(f), 50 
Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).  In 2009, average OMB review time has been thirty-two 
days for significant rules and forty days for others. 
175 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES:  BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 335 tbl.17.1 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BUDGET-2010-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2010-TAB.pdf. 
176 PATTERSON, supra note 167, at 18. 
177 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
EXECUTIVE ORDER GUIDANCE:  OVERVIEW (2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
EOG/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage. 
178 Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and Drug Administration:  
Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 17, 26 (2005). 
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o EPA (1996–1999):  “over two thousand”;179 
o OSHA (2008):  66 interpretations180 and 16 directives181 
(1.5 per week) 
• Enforcement Activity 
o EPA (2008):  20,000 inspections (384 per week); 2056 ad-
ministrative complaints (39 per week); 280 cases referred 
for civil enforcement (5 per week); 319 environmental 
crime cases initiated (6 per week)182 
o OSHA (2007):  39,324 inspections (756 per week)183 
o FDA (2008):  15,245 inspections (293 per week); 17,907 
import refusals (344 per week); 2,721 recall events (52 per 
week); 445 warning letters (8.5 per week); 369 convictions 
(7 per week); 8 seizures184 
• Administrative Orders 
o EPA (2008):  2084 penalty orders (40 per week); 1390 
compliance orders (27 per week)185 
o OSH Review Comm. (2007):  2058 cases disposed of (39 
per week)186 
 
179 Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 397, 399 (2007) (citing COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF 
AGENCY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 5 (2000)). 
180 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., STANDARD 
INTERPRETATIONS (2008), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
owasrch.search_form?p_doc_type=INTERPRETATIONS&p_toc_level=2&p_keyvalue=DA
TE_2008&p_status=CURRENT. 
181 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DIRECTIVES (2008), 
available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owasrch.search_form?p_doc_type=
DIRECTIVES&p_toc_level=2&p_keyvalue=DATE_2008&p_status=CURRENT. 
182 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS FY2008: 
NUMBERS AT A GLANCE (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
reports/endofyear/eoy2008/2008numbers.html. 
183 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA ENFORCEMENT:  
STRIVING FOR SAFE AND HEALTHY WORKPLACES, available at  http://www.osha.gov/dep/
enforcement/enforcement_results_07.html. 
184 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2008 ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS SUMMARY, avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/EnforcementStory/default.htm.  
2008 figures are considerably lower in virtually all these categories than in prior years.  See 
Eric F. Greenberg, Checking in on FDA Enforcement Stats, PACKAGING WORLD MAG., at 22 
(Apr. 2009), available at http://www.packworld.com/article-27319 (compiling and graph-
ing earlier year FDA data). 
185 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 182. 
186 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, FY 2007 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORTS AND 
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• Currently active agency requests to collect information from 
the public (each of which, under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
must be approved by OMB initially, and every three years there-
after187):  8780 (168 per week)188 
• Agency proposed draft bills cleared by OMB (per Congress):  
350–500189 
• Proposed reports/testimony cleared by OMB (per Congress):  
3500–4000190 
• Pages in the Federal Register:  80,700 (1552 per week)191 
This is a rough, obviously incomplete picture of the basic informa-
tion load generated by the federal regulatory enterprise, but it con-
veys the immensity of the task of supervision.  Thanks to the Unified 
Regulatory Agenda,192 the White House now has a reasonably good 
tool for tracking rulemaking activity, and OMB is attempting to moni-
tor the issuance of at least “significant” guidance.193  But would-be 
managers of regulatory policy still have no mechanism for systematic, 
cross-agency monitoring of administrative adjudication, the granting 
of permits and licenses, the denial of petitions for rulemaking, en-
forcement practices, etc.  To be sure, a great deal of this regulatory 
activity concerns (relatively) minor matters that may not merit White 
 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2007), available at http://www.oshrc.gov/performance/
07perfrpt.pdf. 
187 See 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (2006). 
188 U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 
INVENTORY OF CURRENTLY APPROVED INFORMATION COLLECTIONS, available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=5 (total as of December 
2009).  These produce more than 64 billion responses annually, at an estimated annual 
cost of more than $57 billion.  Id. 
189 This range comes from summaries provided by OMB at the outset of the G.W. Bush and 
Obama Administrations, respectively.  See Memorandum from Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Dir. 
to the Heads of Dep’ts and Agencies, Legislative Coordination and Clearance (Feb. 15, 
2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/m01-
12.html; Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir. of Office of Mgmt. & Budget to Heads 
of Dep’ts and Agencies, Legislative Coordination and Clearance (Jan. 27, 2009), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-09.pdf. 
190 This range comes from summaries provided by OMB at the outset of the G.W. Bush and 
Obama Administrations, respectively.  See Memorandum from Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., su-
pra note 189; Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 189. 
191 73 Fed. Reg. 80,700 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/
su_docs/fedreg/a081231c.html. 
192 See GPO ACCESS, THE UNIFIED AGENDA:  MAIN PAGE (2009), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ua/index.html (“[The Unified Agenda] summarizes the rules 
and proposed rules that each Federal agency expects to issue during the next year.”). 
193 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 169. 
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House-level attention, but this simply increases the challenges of in-
formational triage. 
Moreover, managing the policy output of administrative agencies 
is by no means all that the modern President undertakes to do.  As 
well as being head of the government, he is expected also to be head 
of state and leader of his party.  The following are some indicators of 
the informational and attentive demands of those other roles: 
• Relations with Congress (2008 unless otherwise noted) 
o Measures introduced in House and Senate:  4815 (92.5 per 
week)194 
o Statements of Administration Position on pending legisla-
tion (2007):  142 (2.7 per week)195 
o Votes:  472 House; 215 Senate196 
o Measures Passed:  1588 (30.5 per week)197 
- Vetoes:  4198 
- Average annual Bush Administration signing statements 
issued:  19199 
o Budget 
- Smallest Cabinet Department budget (Interior, 2010 
est.):  $11.9 billion200 
- Largest Cabinet Department budget (Health & Human 
Services, 2010 est.):  $873 billion201 
o Nominations 
- Civilian:  3632 (70 per week)202 
 
194 154 CONG. REC. D1336 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.senate.gov/
reference/resources/pdf/110_2.pdf. 
195 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY INDEX, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/legislative/sap/110-1/index-date.html (last vi-
sited Jan. 29, 2010). 
196 154 CONG. REC. D1336 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.senate.gov/
reference/resources/pdf/110_2.pdf. 
197 Id.  These include bills and joint, concurrent, and simple resolutions. 
198 Id. 
199 See Joyce A. Green, List of All Signing Statements Issued by George W. Bush, 
http://www.coherentbabble.com/listGWBall.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
200 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES:  BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 409, tbl.27.1 (2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2010-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2010-PER-1-7-1.pdf. 
201 Id. at 288. 
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- Military:  18,674 (359 per week)203 
• Foreign Affairs 
o Treaties and executive agreements:  136 (2.6 per week)204 
o Foreign personal appearances annually:  32 (2.6 per 
month)205  
• Public 
o Presidential speeches:  23 (2 per month)206 
o News conferences:  18 (1.5 per month)207 
o Other non-partisan public appearances:  298 (25 per 
month)208 
o Partisan political appearances:  65 (5 per month)209 
• Executive orders:  37 (3 per month)210 
In sum, the task of overseeing contemporary U.S. government is 
almost incomprehensibly huge.  To monitor and assess the current 
stream of information relevant to policy formulation—let alone to in-
terpret, synthesize, and formulate a position on this typically complex 
and often conflicting flow—is a task for an institution, not an indi-
vidual.  An institution is, accordingly, what the modern presidency 
has become. 
2.  The Presidential Branch 
The Constitution includes not a word about the White House staff, and they 
are barely mentioned in statute.  Staff members have zero legal authority in 
their own right, yet 100 percent of presidential authority passes through 
their hands. 
  —Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., The White House Staff:  Inside the West Wing and 
Beyond
211 
 
202 154 CONG. REC. D1336 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/110_2.pdf.  Of these, 3229 were con-
firmed, and 403 withdrawn or rejected.  Id. 
203 Id.  Of these, 18,556 were confirmed, and 118 withdrawn or rejected.  Id. 
204 RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 427 (averaging data from 2001–2004). 
205 Id. at 197 (averaging data from 2001–2007). 
206 Id. at 190, 199 (averaging data from 2001–2007). 
207 Id. at 194 (averaging date from 2001–2007). 
208 Id. at 201, 203 (averaging data from 2001–2007). 
209 Id. at 205 (averaging data from 2001–2007). 
210 Id. at 453–54 (averaging data from 2001–2007). 
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With the bureaucratizing of the presidency, it is hardly surprising that the 
White House fell heir to all the problems of a bureaucracy, including the 
distortion of information as it passes through the chain of command . . . . 
  —Stephen Hess, Organizing the Presidency212 
In contemporary political and constitutional mythmaking about 
the presidency, the President works alone—a solitary leader who 
makes the hard choices, does what needs to be done, and bears by 
himself the weight of power and responsibility.  Political scientist 
Hugh Heclo contrasts the reality: 
Our most familiar image of the presidency finds a man, sitting alone, in 
the dimly lit Oval Office.  Against this shadowy background the familiar 
face ponders that ultimate expression of power, a presidential decision. 
  It is a compelling and profoundly misleading picture.  Presidential 
decisions are obviously important.  But a more accurate image would 
show a presidency composed of at least a thousand people—a jumble of 
personal loyalists, professional technocrats, and bureaucratic staff with 
one man struggling, often vainly, to stay abreast of it all.  What that famil-
iar face ponders in the Oval Office is likely to be a series of conversations 
with advisers or a few pages of paper containing several options.  These 
represent the last distillates produced from immense rivers of informa-
tion flowing from sources—and condensed in ways—about which the 
president probably knows little.213 
Stories about a cast of thousands do not capture the popular imagina-
tion in the same way as the struggles of a lone protagonist.  But the 
managerial promises of unitary executive theory cannot be assessed 
without understanding the role of White House staff and other politi-
cal appointees in constructing the modern presidency. 
American Presidents have never tried to manage the information 
and expertise demands of government on their own.  The original in-
stitution to assist them was the Cabinet.  The Cabinet was also the first 
of many presidential support structures that, under the pressure of 
expanding federal government, outgrew their original objective to 
supply “a few loyal and intelligent individuals who would offer coun-
sel when asked and would keep such consultations confidential.”214  
As the executive departments grew in magnitude and complexity over 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it became obvious 
 
211 PATTERSON, supra note 167, at 2. 
212 STEPHEN HESS, ORGANIZING THE PRESIDENCY 5 (3d ed. 2002). 
213 Hugh Heclo, The Changing Presidential Office, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 23, 23–24 
(James P. Pfiffner ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
214 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT:  AN HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW, at CRS-1 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-606.pdf [hereinafter 
“THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT”]. 
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that Presidents needed something other than their Cabinet to collect 
information, provide advice, and help them coordinate key areas and 
programs.215  In 1937, the President’s Committee on Administrative 
Management—the group of prominent political science and public 
administration experts known to administrative law scholars as the 
Brownlow Commission—warned, “The President needs help.”216  As-
sessing existing support as “entirely inadequate,” it recommended: 
[The President should] be given a small number of executive assistants 
who would be his direct aides in dealing with the managerial agencies 
and administrative departments of the Government.  These assistants, 
probably not exceeding six in number, would be in addition to his pre-
sent [Cabinet] secretaries, who deal with the public, with the Congress, 
and with the press and the radio.217   
The result of this and other recommendations was FDR’s creation of 
the Executive Office of the President (EOP), a new institution that 
brought budget management into the White House and provided the 
capacity for additional staff support for the President.218  At the time, 
the EOP was seen as the solution to “effective coordination of the 
tremendously wide-spread federal machinery.”219 
From its initial, fairly modest size, the EOP burgeoned rapidly.220  
Today, the entity created to allow the President to manage the fed-
eral bureaucracy is itself the size of a small agency.  Currently com-
prising about 1800 people (down from a high of 2000 in 1980),221 the 
EOP under President Obama consists of thirteen major offices, 
boards, and councils, some of which have significant subunits.222  The 
most relevant for present purposes is OMB, with about five hundred 
 
215 Woodrow Wilson’s Council of National Defense is generally identified as the first serious 
experiment in a special institution to assist the President in managing a policy domain.  
See id. at CRS-1 to CRS-2. 
216 THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., THE EXERCISE OF RULE-MAKING POWER AND 
THE PREPARATION OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE MEASURES BY ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS 
5 (1937) [hereinafter “Brownlow Commission”]. 
217 Id. 
218 The EOP was created after passage of a statute authorizing the President to propose reor-
ganization plans.  After Congress approved his plan by joint resolution, Roosevelt issued 
an executive order constituting the Executive Office. 
219 THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 214, at CRS-8 (quoting the Brow-
nlow committee). 
220 Accounts of the evolution of the White House domestic policy staff include JOHN HART, 
THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH:  FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 26–129 (2d ed. 1995); 
PATTERSON, supra note 167; SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW, THE DOMESTIC PRESIDENCY:  POLICY 
MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE 5–11 (1997). 
221 See STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 118, at 256–57. 
222 See the list at WhiteHouse.gov, Executive Office of the President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop. 
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career and political appointees.223  About half of these people work in 
the Resource Management Offices, currently five units defined by 
subject area224 and staffed with program examiners who “develop and 
support the President’s Budget and Management Agenda.”225  The 
remainder work in units that oversee procurement, financial man-
agement, and computing and information technology policy,226 that 
develop the Administration position on pending bills and clear agen-
cies’ proposed legislation and congressional testimony,227 and that 
conduct rulemaking review.228  The EOP’s budget for the 2010 fiscal 
year is $439 million.229 
As the EOP grew in tandem with the job of managing the execu-
tive branch, Presidents needed a source of “immediate information 
and advice on pressing national problems that could not be readily 
obtained from the larger executive office.”230  As a result, the White 
House Office (WHO) emerged as the core of the current presidential 
support structure.  Typically headed by the President’s Chief of Staff, 
the WHO is the part of the EOP most tailorable to the organizational 
and decision-making preferences of each individual President.231  But 
the WHO has not been immune from the pressures of increasing in-
formation management and analytical demands, and growing presi-
dential ambitions.  In the Obama Administration, it comprises two 
 
223 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 1109, (2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/eop.pdf. 
224 These are:  Natural Resource Programs; Education, Income Maintenance and Labor Pro-
grams; Health Programs; General Government Programs; and National Security Pro-
grams.  Office of Management & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Organization 
Chart (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/about_omb/omb_org_chart.pdf. 
225 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE MISSION AND STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission/. 
226 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF E-GOVERNMENT & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/e-gov/; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF 
FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/financial_default/; 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_default/. 
227 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 189; Office of Management & Budget, 
Office of Management and Budget’s Legislative Information System, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/gils_lrd-gils/. 
228 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/regulatory_affairs/default/. 
229 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 200, at 409 tbl.27.1.  The total budget for the 
EOP is shown as $747 million, but $308 million of this is the Iraq Relief and Reconstruc-
tion Fund. 
230 RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 321. 
231 See id. at 343–45 (showing wide variation over time in number and function of units in 
WHO). 
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dozen different substantive and administrative units employing al-
most five hundred people.232 
Thus, the trajectory of modern government has been mirrored 
within the presidency:  constantly pressed by the expanding scope 
and complexity of the federal policy agenda and the entities charged 
with pursuing it, Presidents develop new structures to compile and 
analyze information, provide advice, and assert control.  Those struc-
tures ramify, growing in size and specialization as the task of supervi-
sion grows.  And Presidents come to need yet another institution, to 
mediate between them and the structures developed to give them 
help.  The increasing appearance in recent administrations of 
“czars”—individuals appointed by the President to facilitate policy 
monitoring and development across traditional executive branch or-
ganizational units—may be the next iteration of this pattern.233 
The evolution of this large, multi-layered structure to assist the 
President in understanding and controlling the government—which 
some political scientists are now calling the “presidential branch”234—
has two significant consequences for the present discussion. 
First, the contrast drawn by unitary executive theorists between 
the efficient, representationally direct singularity of presidential lea-
 
232 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 223, at 1109; The White House, Executive Office 
of the President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop (last visited Jan 29, 
2010). 
233 Although the practice dates back at least as far as the Nixon Administration’s “energy 
czar,” this has been a controversial point in the Obama Administration.  The Senate re-
cently held two hearings on the issue.  See Examining the History and Legality of Executive 
Branch “Czars” Before the S. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on the Constitution, 111th Cong. 
(2009), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4098; Presiden-
tial Advice and Senate Consent:  The Past, Present, and Future of Policy Czars Before the S. Comm. 
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=
5b22e173-5b74-46a0-b2ab-d300b6381de4. 
   A report published by the National Academy of Public Administration on the eve of 
the Obama Administration urged creation of a new Office of Federal Management to 
remedy perceived failures of OMB to “do[] an effective job of managing the executive 
branch in the President’s interests.”  Ironically, its title echoed the assessment of the 
Brownlow Commission seventy years earlier.  See Ronald C. Moe, The President Needs Help:  
Proposed Office of Federal Management, 4 (Nat’l Acad. of Pub. Admin., Issue Paper, 2008), 
available at http://www.napawash.org/pmc/papers/Moe_Proposed_Office_Federal_
Management_9_08_08.pdf. 
234 E.g., MATTHEW J. DICKINSON, BITTER HARVEST:  FDR, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE 
GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH (1997); HART, supra note 220; NELSON W. POLSBY, 
THOUGHTS ON CONGRESS, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE RISE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
BRANCH (1988).  Cf. Michael John Burton, The Contemporary Presidency:  The “Flying White 
House”:  A Travel Establishment Within the Presidential Branch, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 297 
(2006) (arguing for a broader “functional” definition of the phrase to include more than 
the EOP). 
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dership on the one hand, and the chaotic, democratically deficient 
collectivity of congressional action on the other, is over-simplified to 
the point of inaccuracy.  In important ways, modern presidential lea-
dership is constituted through, and carried out by, a large and diverse 
group of White House advisers and staff.  This is not meant to imply 
that anyone in this group disputes who is really “the boss.”  Rather, it 
is an effort to import into legal theorizing about the presidency a real 
world dynamic long recognized by organizational theorists and other 
social scientists:  leaders need followers as much as followers need 
leaders.235  The President is dependent upon his advisers and support-
ing staff because he must be; his dependency increases as the de-
mands of the office and the scope of presidential ambition grow.  
They identify the individuals, groups, and issues that merit his per-
sonal attention,236 determine the content and framing of the informa-
tion he receives,237 and communicate “the White House position” on 
various policy matters to everyone else.238  None of these people, save 
the Vice President, is elected; most of them are invisible to the pub-
lic.239 
 
235 See, e.g., KELLERMAN, supra note 44; Edwin P. Hollander, The Essential Interdependence of 
Leadership and Followership, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 71 (1992); Sumon Ma-
jumdar & Sharun W. Mukand, The Leader as Catalyst:  On Leadership and the Mechanics of In-
stitutional Change (CESifo., Working Paper No. 2337, 2008). 
236 See, e.g., FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE PRESIDENTIAL DIFFERENCE:  LEADERSHIP STYLE FROM 
FDR TO GEORGE W. BUSH 152–53 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the frustration of some of 
Reagan’s principal advisers when staff structure changed to hierarchical model under 
Chief of Staff Donald Regan, who rigorously controlled access to the President). 
237 See, e.g., RICHARD M. PIOUS, WHY PRESIDENTS FAIL 92–107 (2008) (arguing that Carter’s 
pollster Patrick Caddell was key in shaping his perception of the existence and nature of 
a crisis in his presidency); Andrew Rudalevige, “The Decider”:  Issue Management and the 
Bush White House, in THE GEORGE W. BUSH LEGACY 135, 139 (Colin Campbell et al. eds., 
2008) (concluding that the “centralized politicization” of the George W. Bush Admini-
stration increased responsiveness to presidential policy preferences, but excluded analy-
ses and alternatives that the President needed to calculate those preferences in an in-
formed way). 
238 For a vivid picture of how relations become strained between staff on the one hand and 
members of the Cabinet and other high-level presidential appointees on the other, see 
HESS, supra note 212, at 16–18.  See also SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW, POWERSHARING:  WHITE 
HOUSE-CABINET RELATIONS IN THE MODERN PRESIDENCY (1996) (describing increasing 
dominance of White House vis-à-vis Cabinet departments in policymaking since Nixon 
presidency). 
239 The intense controversy over Dick Cheney’s role during the George W. Bush Administra-
tion, see, e.g., BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER:  THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY (2008); SHIRLEY 
ANNE WARSHAW, THE CO-PRESIDENCY OF BUSH AND CHENEY (2009), underscores that 
Americans are not prepared to accept that even an elected presidential adviser has signifi-
cant power in Administration policymaking.  The scope of Cheney’s influence was surely 
atypical, but he is not the first modern Vice President to draw criticism for undue influ-
ence on policy.  Dan Quayle’s role while chairing the Council on Competitiveness was a 
frequent bone of contention during the George H.W. Bush Administration.  See CHARLES 
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Second, overseeing this multi-layered support structure is itself a 
formidable management imperative for the new President.  A vast lit-
erature—authored by White House veterans, scholars of the presi-
dency, and experts in public administration—is devoted to how the 
White House establishment has been, and ought to be, selected, or-
ganized and supervised.240  Much of this literature recounts the fail-
ures of previous chief executives:  delegating too much to others, or 
not enough; allowing the President’s closest aides too great a power 
to filter whom he sees and what he hears, or attempting vainly to see 
and hear everything himself; establishing advising and decision struc-
tures that stifle questioning and disagreement, or trying to craft pol-
icy and take action based on infighting and ambivalent dithering.  
The advice on how to avoid these errors varies, but the basic lesson is 
the same:  for the modern President, the quest to direct the federal 
government begins with the challenge of managing his own house. 
The people on whom the President relies to help him control the 
government are not all in the White House.  In appointing Cabinet 
Secretaries, agency heads, and various subordinate agency officials, 
the President in theory extends his influence throughout the execu-
tive branch by placing “his” people in key positions of responsibility.  
In actual practice, Presidents have mixed success using political ap-
pointments as instruments of organizational oversight and policy di-
rection.241  The sheer size of federal government creates an impossi-
 
TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY:  THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY FOR 
GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 61–88 (1994); Robert J. Duffy, Divided Government and 
Institutional Combat:  The Case of the Quayle Council on Competitiveness, 28 POLITY 379 (1996). 
240 In addition to works cited in previous notes, this literature includes: JOHN P. BURKE, 
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS:  FROM POLITICS TO PRACTICE (2000); KOWERT, supra note 
165; JAMES PFIFFNER, THE STRATEGIC PRESIDENCY:  HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING (2d ed. 
1996); THOMAS PRESTON, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS INNER CIRCLE:  LEADERSHIP STYLE AND 
THE ADVISORY PROCESS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2001); THE NERVE CENTER:  LESSONS IN 
GOVERNING FROM THE WHITE HOUSE CHIEFS OF STAFF (Terry Sullivan ed., 2004); Samuel 
Kernell, The Evolution of the White House Staff, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 
213, at 37. 
241 E.g., WARSHAW, supra note 220, at 117–44 (describing how, after departure of President 
Reagan’s Assistant to the President for Policy Development Martin Anderson, 
“[d]epartments began moving in their own directions, which often were at odds with the 
administration’s broad goals” even though a key strategy had been selecting appointees 
who shared Reagan’s conservative, deregulatory agenda); id. at 169–70 (describing spe-
cific instances during the George H.W. Bush presidency when appointed agency heads 
publicly took policy positions at odds with those of White House); id at 185–210 (describ-
ing how lack of clear domestic policy goals coming into office and Clinton’s choice of an 
ideologically diverse Cabinet hampered consistent, effective domestic policy control); 
George A. Krause & Brent M. Dupay, Coordinated Action and the Limits of Presidential Control 
over the Bureaucracy:  Lessons from the Bush Presidency, in PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH’S 
INFLUENCE OVER BUREAUCRACY AND POLICY 81 (Colin Provost & Paul Teske eds., 2009) 
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ble management paradox.  On the one hand, presidential appointees 
represent only a very thin layer at the top of the major regulatory en-
tities.242  This has been a source of frustration for Presidents, and re-
cent administrations have sought to extend the influence of political 
appointees in the administrative policymaking process.243  On the 
other hand, the opportunity to select even a tiny fraction of the ex-
ecutive branch workforce translates into the President finding more 
than 3300 people to be his voice out in the government.244  Stephen 
Hess, staffer in Republican administrations and adviser to Republican 
and Democratic Presidents, describes how political reality compro-
mises the theory of extended presidential control through appoint-
ment: 
 
(presenting case studies of the New Source Review Program and the National Security 
Agency’s domestic surveillance program as instances when political appointees either de-
layed implementation of or thwarted entirely the President’s policy preferences). 
242 For example, less than 0.5% of EPA’s nearly 18,000 employees are presidentially ap-
pointed; of employees at the manager level, the percentage is 2.91%.  See DAVID E. LEWIS, 
THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS:  POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC 
PERFORMANCE 82, 105 (2008) (giving data for other agencies as well). 
243 This has not occurred through an overall increase in the number of political appointees, 
see id. at 100 tbl.4.3, but rather through such strategies as heightened White House con-
trol over positions formally filled by agency heads, see note infra 244 (Schedule C ap-
pointments), shifting the proportion of political appointees among agencies depending 
upon the degree to which the agency’s general policy orientation departs from the Presi-
dent’s agenda, see note 268 infra (describing patterns in Clinton, and both Bush, presi-
dencies); and “management” steps such as the Bush Administration’s Executive Order 
13,422 (2007), which required a presidentially-appointed regulatory policy officer to serve 
as the gatekeeper for agency rulemaking.  LEWIS, supra note 242, at 103; see also Amending 
Executive Order 12866:  Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation?  Part I and Part II:  Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technol-
ogy, 110th Cong. (2007), available at  http://science.house.gov/Publications/
hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsID=1777 (testimony of numerous regulatory law ex-
perts criticizing this for extending White House political control over regulation). 
244 This figure is based on 2004 data and includes three components:  (i) just under 1000 
PAS (presidential appointment, senate confirmation) executive policymaking positions, 
which include the very top of the management pyramid in agencies, plus US attorneys 
and ambassadors; (ii) about 700 positions in the Senior Executive Service, the senior 
management level that may, by statute, be up to 10% political appointees; and (iii) about 
1600 Schedule C positions, which include special or confidential assistants to PAS ap-
pointees, directors of communications, and legislative liaisons.  Although technically se-
lected by the agency head, the White House has exercised significant control over Sched-
ule C appointments since the Reagan administration.  Gabriel Horton & David E. Lewis, 
Turkey Farms, Patronage, and Obama Administration Appointments 5 (Ctr. for the Study of 
Democratic Inst., Working Paper No. 09-03, 2009), available at 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/
working%20papers/gabe%20and%20dave%20nov%2009.pdf (analyzing biographical da-
ta of more than 1000 people appointed in first 6 months of Obama Administration).  The 
figure given in the text is conservative.  The total number may be as high as 9000 once 
judgeships and advisory commission appointments are included.  See id. at 5 n.7. 
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A president-elect has political debts and obligations, but they are not 
necessarily to those with the backgrounds he now needs.  Thus he some-
times picks incompetents.  Often he turns to strangers.  With each ap-
pointment, he makes a contract to share his responsibilities.  If it turns 
out that the appointee and the president disagree, the appointee can 
quit or the president can fire the appointee.  Either action is a tacit ad-
mission of failure on the part of the nation’s leader.  More commonly, 
the president and the appointee split their differences and the president 
loses some part of the direction of his administration.245 
In sum, although the President is a single individual, the modern 
presidency is a large and complicated institution.  It is constituted 
from a mélange of people that includes substantive policy and tech-
nical experts, those with “insider” experience in Washington gov-
ernment, campaign and party loyalists, representatives of interest 
groups whose support helped the President get elected and/or is 
needed to advance his policy agenda, and nominees capable of sur-
viving the confirmation process.246  These people bring widely varying 
skills and competency to their interaction with the career officials 
and front-line staff who hold the substantive and institutional knowl-
edge to make things happen (or not) within agencies.  Using them to 
accomplish the diffusion of presidential leadership through the ex-
ecutive branch poses considerable management challenges.  More 
importantly, it involves substantial agency costs that advocates of Pres-
ident-centered government ignore.247  No strategy of selection and di-
rection allows the President to fill several thousand (or even several 
hundred) vacancies with people who are his alter ego—that is, who 
will unfailingly give him the information he would want to have (if he 
knew it existed) and who will reliably convey to the people who do 
 
245 HESS, supra note 212, at 13. 
246 See RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 321 (describing three strategies Presidents use in ap-
pointments:  “Get the best people possible” (the bureaucratic strategy); “Get the people 
you know best” (the intimacy strategy); and “Get people from the party and interest 
groups” (the representation strategy)); Martha Joynt Kumar, The White House as City Hall:  
A Tough Place to Organize, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 44, 47, 49–50 (2001) (describing four 
groups from which Presidents make appointments:  Campaign people, who tend to 
“think in a short time span, see the world in black and white, and have a sense of attack”; 
personal presidential choices, “a handful of people to occupy positions [Presidents] con-
sider to be crucial to the manner in which their presidenc[ies] function”; substantive pol-
icy people, “whose first thought is not the politics of it but the substance of it”; and peo-
ple with White House experience, who know “how White Houses work and are 
structured, [and] how decisions get made” (internal quotations omitted)). 
247 Political scientist George Krause helpfully conceptualizes these costs as problems of “ver-
tical coordination between presidents and their subordinates”; “horizontal coordination 
among subordinates,” and “credible commitments arising from” relatively short tenure in 
office.  George A. Krause, Organizational Complexity and Coordination Dilemmas in U.S. Ex-
ecutive Politics, 39 PRESIDENTIAL. STUD. Q. 74, 75 (2009). 
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the day-to-day work of government the message he would want them 
to hear. 
3.  The Man Behind the Curtain 
Trends have made more difficult for presidents that which was always 
difficult but less aspired to—command of the instrumentalities of 
government and control over policy. 
  —Bert A. Rockman, The Leadership Question:  The Presidency and the American 
System
248
 
[Presidents] seek singular control of information and policy decisions but 
are forced to work through a collective apparatus.  The pastiche of staffs, 
interests, and loyalties make it difficult for presidents to gain either the 
information or the control they seek. . . . The problem of control seems 
inherently unsolvable. 
  —Lyn Ragsdale, Vital Statistics on the Presidency
249
 
Like the democracy claim, the “good government” claim of uni-
tary executive theory lays a simplistic, reassuring veneer over a messy, 
disquieting reality.  Its wise, well-informed, and deliberative Manager-
in-Chief is ready and able to provide the hands-on leadership that can 
infuse rational coordination, sensible prioritization, and public-
regarding direction into the sprawling and conflicted federal policy-
making enterprise.  In fact, however, when the ambition of a unitary 
executive President to control federal regulatory policy meets the 
massive scope and complexity of modern regulatory government, the 
results are very different from what unitary executive theory prom-
ises. 
First, Presidents may aspire to comprehensive, coherent direction 
of regulatory policy but White House control is in fact sporadic, at 
times cacophonous, and often imperfectly realized.  How could it be 
otherwise?  It is costly for Presidents and their advisers to monitor the 
mass of agencies’ policymaking activities, to develop positions on the 
often complex underlying substantive issues, to communicate those 
positions to the people formally empowered to decide, and to actu-
ally get a decision implementing the President’s policy. 
With respect to locating appropriate targets for presidential atten-
tion, the White House—like Congress—can use “fire alarm” signals 
from interest groups, influential constituents, and the media to iden-
 
248 BERT A. ROCKMAN, THE LEADERSHIP QUESTION:  THE PRESIDENCY AND THE AMERICAN 
SYSTEM 168 (1984). 
249 RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 321–22 (emphasis omitted). 
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tify targets of interest.  But formal modeling and empirical work con-
firm what intuition suggests about this solution to the costs of infor-
mation gathering and expertise gaps:  it cannot produce consistent, 
systematic oversight, and so introduces significant biases into the reg-
ulatory process.250  Moreover, identifying the regulatory targets of 
White House interest is only the beginning.  The specific actions con-
sistent with the President’s policy agenda must be determined, and 
conveyed to the people in agencies with the authority to take them.  
As the power of the presidency has become (in the words of presi-
dential scholar Hugh Heclo) “more extended, scattered and 
shared, . . . less of a prerogative, less unilateral, and less closely held 
by the man himself,”251 the “President’s” position may in fact be con-
structed, and delivered, by multiple voices.  Academic and insider ac-
counts of White House operations describe an intensely absorbed, 
highly energized atmosphere generated by staff units with distinct 
expertise and perspectives.252  At their best, they robustly debate the 
multiple substantive and political implications of policy options; at 
their worst, they vie for advantage and influence.253  Even under the 
most optimistic assumptions of universal, disinterested competence 
and good judgment, the information flowing up to the President 
about implications and options will be imperfect—and the message 
 
250 E.g., Barry R. Weingast, Caught in the Middle:  The President, Congress, and the Political-
Bureaucratic System, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 312, 329–30 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark A. 
Peterson eds., 2005) (use of fire-alarm oversight creates incentives for political appointees 
to avoid actions that harm constituents of their Congressional or White House princi-
pals); see also Hugo Hopenhayn & Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political 
Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 196 (1996); cf. Sidney A. Shapiro, Po-
litical Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1994) 
(describing how Reagan Administration initiation of centralized OMB review of rules re-
vealed shortcomings of fire alarm oversight that led Congress to change its strategy). 
251 Heclo, supra note 213, at 30. 
252 E.g., RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 316, 345 (offering empirical data about WHO under 
various Presidents, and noting that during George W. Bush Administration, “the level of 
specialization, especially in the WHO, is striking”); WARSHAW, supra note 220, at 14 (de-
scribing how the “White House staff has become a series of separate, and generally insti-
tutionalized, units with different responsibilities, different constituencies, and different 
operating behavior”). 
253 See HESS, supra note 212, at 5 (identifying one characteristic of the modern presidency as 
“that presidential assistants have increasingly become special pleaders”); Robert Durant, 
Back to the Future?  Toward Revitalizing the Study of the Administrative Presidency, 39 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 89, 106 (2009) (arguing that over time “presidential appointees 
tend to become just as stove-piped, jurisdictional, and imperialistic in their thinking and 
actions” as the agencies whose policy the White House is trying to direct). 
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flowing down to agency officials about “what the President wants 
done” will at times be ambiguous, even contradictory.254 
And even when a clear policy position emerges, the White House 
is not alone in trying to control the regulatory outcome.  A significant 
element of the unitary executive debate involves the true locus of au-
thority to exercise the power delegated in regulatory statutes.255  Re-
gardless of the formal allocation of power, however, presidential pre-
ferences must in fact compete with those of multiple congressional 
committees with jurisdiction over the issue; interest groups who can 
provide or withhold crucial political support to the President, as well 
as mobilize media and grassroots opinion; state governors and other 
local officials who feel the regional impacts of regulatory actions; and 
sometimes even the divergent views of the agency leadership he ap-
pointed.256  Even Presidents must pick their battles, and the White 
 
254 See, e.g., GEORGE G. EDWARDS III & STEPHEN J. WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP:  
POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING 288–95 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing range of personal, politi-
cal, and organizational factors that can impede transmission of clear, consistent policy di-
rectives from President to agencies); HESS, supra note 212, at 177–78 (discussing the seri-
ous potential for “distortion” as a major management problem:  “Simple messages have 
the best chance of surviving intact.  But presidential messages are rarely simple, and in 
the modern White House fewer and fewer aides hear directly from the president what he 
really wants done”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Adminis-
trative State:  A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 66–69 
(noting that, in interviews, EPA political appointees from George H.W. Bush and Clinton 
Administrations described how multiple White House staff purported to speak for the 
President, at times with contradictory direction). 
255 The strongest unitary executive position (not endorsed by all unitarians) is that, regard-
less of the identity of the official to whom a statute purports to delegate regulatory au-
thority, the only true recipient of the power can be the President.  Inasmuch as he is 
alone vested by Article II with the executive power, action by the statutory designee is at 
his sufferance, and he may at any point determine to take the action himself.  Compare, 
e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 82–85, with Pierce, supra note 6, at 520 (arguing that the 
President has the power to fire decisionmakers who disobey a presidential directive, but 
not to exercise the delegated authority himself). 
256 Several empirical studies document how competition between presidential and congres-
sional preferences in environmental regulation has produced fluctuating levels of EPA 
activity.  E.g., B. Dan Wood, Bureaucrats, Principals, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforce-
ments, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dy-
namics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 818–21 (1991).  For 
evidence of the impact on attempted White House control from congressional and other 
sources of regulatory policy competition, see, for example, Wood & Waterman, supra note 
256, at 806–07 (finding that early Reagan Administration success in cutting back on anti-
discrimination enforcement by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission diminished 
after controversial General Counsel Michael Connelly resigned and was replaced by a 
“career-oriented” appointee who was “more palatable to the Congress and EEOC con-
stituencies”); id. at 811–12 (finding competing congressional and presidential influence 
on number of safety violations cited by Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors); id. at 
815–16 (finding decline in number of National Highway Transportation Safety Admini-
stration engineering evaluations, despite strong Administration interest in auto safety, 
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House will sometimes be forced strategically to refrain from policy di-
rection.  Capturing these complexities of policy leadership in con-
temporary U.S. government, White House veteran Stephen Hess de-
scribes how Presidents come to discover that: 
the experience of being president was different from what [they] 
thought it would be or from what [they] learned in [their] civics text-
books.  Four years or eight years seemed like a very long time from the 
outside, a very short time when [they were] in office.  It is never long 
enough to do any real planning—to think about where the country 
ought to be, even in the next decade, and to design programs to get from 
here to there.  [Their] time was consumed by crises and the demands of 
others, bargaining with legislators, waging feuds, performing small sym-
bolic acts, worrying about getting reelected, finding people for jobs and 
getting rid of them (often by kicking them upstairs), approving budgets 
that [they] could only change around the edges.  [They] never really 
“ran” the government, as [they] had expected.257 
The second significant dimension on which the reality of presi-
dential oversight differs from the unitary executive story is politics.  
Presidents since Ronald Reagan have unabashedly admitted that their 
“management agenda” involves not only coordination, rationaliza-
tion, and conflict resolution, but also aligning regulatory outputs with 
“the President’s priorities.”258  So long as the story features a Repre-
sentative-in-Chief who truly and distinctively embodies the voters’ 
mandate, the wishes of the national majoritarian coalition, or the in-
terests of the whole nation, this expansive view of what counts as 
“management” can claim to be a virtue.  Conflating management 
with the imposition of a particular set of policy preferences becomes 
far more problematic, however, once the President’s delphic claim to 
 
during tenure of appointee whose regulatory philosophy was unexpectedly at odds with 
Administration’s); id. at 817–18 (finding impact on Reagan Administration pattern of de-
regulating surface mining after state government pushback); see also Durant, supra note 
253, at 97–105 (case studies of Clinton Administration effort to increase military envi-
ronmental compliance).  For a broadbased model of the ways in which Presidents can 
unilaterally effect policy control, and the circumstances in which congressional and judi-
cial action is likely to limit unilateral presidential policy direction, see WILLIAM G. 
HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION:  THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 
(2003). 
257 HESS, supra note 212, at 20. 
258 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 4 (Sept. 30, 1993).  See also OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 225 (OMB’s Resource Management offices exist to “develop 
and support the President’s Budget and Management Agenda,” which involves “pro-
vid[ing] ongoing policy and management guidance to federal agencies”).  Since the for-
malization of centralized White House rulemaking review in the early months of the Rea-
gan Administration, see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981), the 
proportion of rules as to which OMB required a change before designating “consistent” 
with White House criteria has risen from 5% (1981) to 72% (2007).  RAGSDALE, supra 
note 10, at 317, 348–51. 
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channel the will of the people is called into question—and it is deeply 
disturbing when the account is fleshed out to include the central role 
of White House staff and other political appointees, who have no 
even colorable claim to oracular representational status. 
A less simplistic and romanticized understanding of presidential 
politics would predict that presidential policy direction will reflect the 
jumbled mix we see elsewhere in the democratic political environ-
ment:  disinterested conception of the public good; constituency ser-
vice; rational strategy for consolidating and extending political influ-
ence; narrowly self-interested (if not actually unethical) behavior; and 
ordinary, garden variety ambivalence and equivocation.  This is in-
deed what anecdotal and (limited) empirical evidence reveals.  White 
House direction of regulatory policy sometimes takes the politically-
tough high road of far-sighted wisdom; the rest of the time, it attends 
to some regulatory players more than others,259 responds to the wishes 
of groups that have been important to the President’s political suc-
cess,260 favors electorally significant interests and areas,261 and furthers 
the personal interests of close presidential advisers.262  This does not 
make presidential policy preferences more suspect than those of other 
major actors in the regulatory arena, but it should warn us against giv-
ing the President monopoly power over regulatory policy under the 
guise of “good government” management, rather than forcing the 
 
259 See, e.g., Virginia Sapiro & David T. Canon, Race, Gender, and the Clinton Presidency, in THE 
CLINTON LEGACY 169, 170 (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman eds., 2000) (discussing 
how Bill Clinton “focused substantial attention on the distinctive needs” of African Amer-
icans, Hispanics and feminist women’s groups through appointments, policies and “sym-
bolic politics,” and received in return support at crucial moments in his presidency); Duf-
fy, supra note 239, at 387–95 (discussing examples that fueled criticism of George H. W. 
Bush Administration Council on Competitiveness for “granting privileged access to indus-
try groups, allowing them to push for [regulatory] concessions they were unable to attain 
from Congress or the EPA” while keeping public interest groups “at arms-length”). 
260 Mark A. Peterson, Still a Government of Chums:  Bush, Business, and Organized Interests, in 
THE GEORGE W. BUSH LEGACY 288, 313–15 (Colin Campbell et al. eds., 2008) (discussing 
a range of policy contexts and concluding that business and conservative interest groups 
and organizations “financed [George W. Bush’s] campaigns, provided a significant pro-
portion of the personnel for his administration, granted the coherent coalitional re-
sources to gain leverage over legislation and policymaking in support of their shared 
agendas, and were richly rewarded with policy outcomes not to be widely shared with an-
yone else”); cf. Mark A. Peterson, Clinton and Organized Interests:  Splitting Friends, Unifying 
Enemies, in THE CLINTON LEGACY 140 (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman eds., 2000) 
(discussing contradictions and failures of Clinton’s interest group strategies with respect 
to traditional Democratic supporters such as organized labor). 
261 See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text. 
262 See, e.g., WARSHAW, supra note 239, at 132–58 (reviewing energy, environmental, and pro-
curement contexts in which Vice President Cheney controlled policy outcomes to the 
benefit of former clients, associates, and future employer). 
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White House to compete in the democratic marketplace with all the 
other voices contending to define what regulatory policy best serves 
the people’s interests. 
The third significant area in which the reality of presidential 
“management” differs from unitary executive promises involves the 
cost to certain values that have been central to the growth of the reg-
ulatory state.  One of these values is expertise.  We no longer be-
lieve—if we ever did—that achieving good regulatory policy requires 
only assembling the right team of experts.  But even before the sci-
ence controversies of the George W. Bush Administration,263 in-
formed observers of the regulatory process had become concerned 
that aggressive presidential directory efforts induce the opposite sort 
of error:  treating regulation as if it were all (or mostly) politics.264  A 
philosophy of governing rooted in claims about the representational 
supremacy and superior managerial rationality of presidential control 
will predictably devalue the role of knowledge (and knowledge-
holders) lying outside the President’s purview.265  Even if the democ-
racy and managerial claims of unitary executive theory were well-
founded, a predilection for subordinating subject-area experience 
and scientific opinion to political judgment is a more serious threat 
to sound regulatory policy than overstating the value of expertise.  
Experts cannot give us the right answers when fundamental value 
choices must be made, but they can define the range of sensible regu-
latory options, bring to bear practical wisdom informed by experi-
ence, and prevent us from making costly cognitive errors of percep-
tion and judgment.266 
Concerns that the unitary executive approach to management ac-
tually threatens sound regulatory decision making have been vali-
dated by David Lewis’s recent analysis of bureaucratic performance 
during the George W. Bush administration, the presidency that built 
 
263 See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The President as Scientist-in-Chief, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
565 (2009); W. Henry Lambright, Government and Science:  A Troubled, Critical Relationship 
and What Can Be Done About It, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 5 (2008); Donald P. Moynihan & 
Alasdair S. Roberts, The End of an Idea?  The Bush Administration and the Exhaustion of the Po-
liticized Presidency (La Follette School Working Paper No. 2008-024), available at 
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers/moynihan2008-024.pdf. 
264 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 250; Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics:  The Transforma-
tion of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745 (1996). 
265 It does not seem coincidental that Ronald Reagan, in whose presidency unitary executive 
theory was born, was also known for the vehemence of his public derision of “the bu-
reaucracy”—i.e., career federal executive employees. 
266 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 164, at 575–77, 579–82, 601–03 (exploring the 
strengths and weaknesses of lay and expert decision making, and the resulting dangers of 
excessive political control over regulatory outcomes). 
418 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
on and extended twenty years of determined politicization of admin-
istrative agencies.267  On the Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART)—the numerical measure devised by the Administration and 
administered by OMB to grade program performance—programs 
headed by political appointees got systematically lower grades than 
those led by career managers; higher percentages of appointees on the 
management team also produced lower PART scores.268  Analyzing 
demographic characteristics of careerists and appointees that might 
plausibly relate to management performance, Professor Lewis found 
that previous experience in the program and longer tenure in man-
agement positions were the systematic differences that had explana-
tory value.269 
Programs managed by political appointees also fared badly in an-
other Bush Administration measure of performance—the Federal 
Human Capital Survey, designed to measure “employees’ perceptions 
of whether, and to what extent, conditions characterizing successful 
 
267 The study used government-wide data from government sources:  the “Plum Book” (the 
list of presidentially appointed positions, officially titled United States Government Policy 
and Supporting Positions, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/), the Cen-
tral Personnel Data File of the Office of Personnel Management, the Program Assessment 
Rating Tool, and the Federal Human Capital Survey.  See LEWIS, supra note 242, at 103, 
189. 
268 LEWIS, supra note 242, at 172–84.  Analyzing how Presidents shifted the incidence of po-
litical appointees across agencies, Professor Lewis found that Presidents George H.W. 
Bush and George W. Bush targeted agencies with a “liberal” policy orientation for addi-
tional appointments, while President Clinton targeted those with a “conservative” orienta-
tion.  Id. at 127–28 (finding, inter alia, that “[t]he advent of a Republican administration 
is estimated to increase the number of [Senate-confirmed] appointees by 50 positions in 
liberal or moderate agencies compared to only 10 in conservative agencies”).  These re-
sults were robust even after controlling for differences among programs (e.g., type, 
budget), variations in management environment (size, executive or independent, inter-
nal organization), and policy content (liberal/conservative tilt, creation during divided 
government).  Id. at 180–84. 
269 Id. at 188–89.  Professor Lewis observes that political appointees lack “site-specific knowl-
edge[,] . . . . expertise in specific policy areas, familiarly with key stakeholders, an under-
standing of the folkways and informal power relationship of the agency and its policy 
arena, and aspects of federal work as mundane as how the accounting, records, and per-
sonnel systems work.”  Id. at 144.  Even demographic characteristics that would seem to 
favor appointee managers in terms of program performance–higher levels of education, 
private management experience, and previous work in the White House or Congress–
could not compensate.  Id. at 185.  The average tenure of top appointees (PAS) was only 
twenty-four months; that of lower level appointees was even shorter.  Id. at 145.  Professor 
Lewis points out that shorter management tenure has implications throughout the pro-
gram:  “Increased turnover creates leadership vacuums, sends mixed signals about agency 
goals, and diminishes an agency’s commitment to reform, resulting in generally poorer 
performance.”  Id. at 145.  It also “disrupts working relationships among functionally re-
lated agencies and programs.”  Id. 
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organizations are present in their agencies.”270  Those programs got 
systematically lower employee ratings on leadership, management 
and work climate than programs run by careerists.271  As the percent-
age of appointees on the management team increased, employees 
were less likely to respond that their agency’s management “gener-
ate[s] high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce,” 
“review[s] and evaluate[s] the organization’s progress toward meet-
ing its goals,” and “promote[s] communication among different work 
units.”272 
The second core value at risk from the unitary executive man-
agement claim is most immediately conceptualized as legality—but 
might ultimately be understood as democracy itself.  Peter Strauss has 
powerfully described how White House direction can disrupt the in-
tricate network of statutory and judicially-imposed duties and con-
straints within which agencies must act.273  To be sure, legality is no 
more the sole guarantor of sound regulatory policy than expertise.  
But presidential judgment cannot supply all that is lost when politics 
supersedes administrative law.  Our perennial focus on making regu-
latory processes faster, cheaper, and smarter tends to obscure one of 
the existing, most fundamental strengths of those processes:  judged 
by the current top two metrics of democratic government—
“transparency” and “participation”—administrative policymaking is 
clearly superior to any other type of federal government decision 
making.  By law, most important regulatory actions must be publicly 
announced.  Agencies do not have the presidential prerogative of 
making law by secret directive and unannounced modification.274  By 
 
270 U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., ENSURING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS AN 
EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN WORKFORCE, FEDERAL HUMAN CAPITAL SURVEY, 
http://www.fhcs.opm.gov/.  The Survey was administered every other year by the Office 
of Personnel Management, an independent agency that manages the civil service.  Profes-
sor Lewis analyzed 2002 and 2004 data. 
271 See LEWIS, supra note 242, at 189–94. 
272 Id. at 195.  The quoted language comes from the Survey questions. 
273 See Strauss, supra note 12; Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
965 (1997). 
274 Although executive orders are now routinely published in the Federal Register, a signifi-
cant number of presidential directives are not publicly available.  See the lists maintained 
by the Federation of American Scientists.  FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, PRESIDENTIAL 
DIRECTIVES AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 29, 2010).  The George W. Bush Administration OLC advised that no public no-
tice was required when the President determined to modify or depart from a published 
executive order.  While this advice seems consistent with existing law, commenters were 
quick to point out its implications with respect to, for example, Executive Order Number 
12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), which limits executive branch electronic sur-
veillance of Americans traveling abroad, who are not covered by existing statutory protec-
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law, any individual (even those disenfranchised from voting) can 
comment on a proposed rulemaking and is entitled to have his or her 
comment considered by the agency.  Those who get to address con-
gressional or White House policy makers do only as a matter of grace, 
and no one suggests such privileges are universally available or equi-
tably distributed.  Even in administrative adjudication, opportunities 
for participation are broader than in the federal courts, who hear on-
ly those with certain, legally cognizable types of injuries and interests.  
By law, most important regulatory decisions must be publicly justified, 
with reference to a contemporaneous factual record and reasons that 
are sensible and within the agency’s statutory charge.  The obligation 
to explain their exercise of public power is minimal on Congress275 
and effectively nonexistent on the President.276  By law, agencies must 
open their deliberative meetings to any member of the public, and 
respond to requests for information about their activities from any 
individual or group.  Congress, the President, and the courts are ca-
tegorically exempt from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and 
the Government in the Sunshine Act.277 
To be sure, the reality of public engagement in regulatory decision 
making is nowhere near the level of legally-supported transparency 
and participation.  However, not even the potential of broad-based cit-
izen understanding and involvement exists if the processes of admin-
istrative law are short-circuited or overridden by White House direc-
tion.278  Here as well, unitary executive theory turns out to 
undermine, rather than advance, a constitutive ideal of the regulatory 
 
tions.  See Secret Law and the Threat to Democratic and Accountable Government:  Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. (April 20, 2008), available 
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3305; Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and 
Separated Powers:  Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489 (2007). 
275 Unless the statute implicates a suspect class or fundamental right, or attempts to abrogate 
the states’ sovereign immunity, Congress gets the benefit of judicial willingness to hy-
pothesize “any state of facts [that] reasonably may be conceived to justify” its policy judg-
ment.  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). 
276 See Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 
1210–11 (2009) (discussing the “background presumption” of presidential exceptional-
ism and arguing that longstanding doctrines that exclude judicial review of presidential 
findings and determinations should be replaced). 
277 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552b (2006).  The exemptions of Congress and the judiciary are explicit. 
See id. §§ 551; 552(f).  The exemption of the President is implicit.  See Franklin v. Massa-
chusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992).  The Executive Office of the President is expressly in-
cluded in these transparency statutes, but increasingly expansive claims of executive privi-
lege temper the practical effect of the statutory inclusion.  See infra notes 278–79 and 
accompanying text. 
278 For a proposal to change this legal regime with respect to transparency at least, see Nina 
A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010). 
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state.  Invoking the principle of executive privilege, the George W. 
Bush Administration routinely refused congressional requests for in-
formation relevant to agency and program oversight, substantially in-
creased the number of classified documents as secret and the range 
of executive officials with authority to impose this classification, sub-
stantially increased the number of FOIA denials on grounds other 
than the national security exemption, and asserted power to prevent 
the release of a previous administration’s records even if the former 
President disagrees.279  This assertion of presidential prerogative to 
control access to information is so extreme, in degree and compre-
hensiveness, that even those generally sympathetic to executive privi-
lege conclude that the doctrine has been stretched almost beyond 
recognition.280  Yet, as the Conclusion develops further, the progres-
sion toward extremism is not surprising given the nature of unitary 
executive ideology. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Leaders and followers share responsibility for leadership, bad as well as 
good. . . . None of us is off the hook. 
  —Barbara Kellerman, Bad Leadership
 281 
The movement toward President-centered government is one of 
the most significant trends in modern American history.  During 
most of this time, the shift has been incremental, de facto, and situ-
ational.  The President was the natural beneficiary of leadership 
needs and opportunities created by the domestic growth of a massive 
federal regulatory enterprise and the international emergence of 
world-wide warfare and global geopolitics.  This pragmatic evolution 
towards a balance of power decidedly in favor of the executive was 
immeasurably aided by communication technologies that allowed the 
President to reach out personally to the people, explaining and ex-
horting, framing events and seeking alliance. 
These political and cultural developments maintained an uneasy 
relationship with the Constitution.  When put to legal test, vigorous 
 
279 See PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE:  HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 121–32 (2009). 
280 See, e.g., Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?:  Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush Pres-
idency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403 (2002) (assessment, by a scholarly defender of executive privi-
lege, that the Bush Administration has weakened the principle of executive privilege by 
overreaching and departing from “recognized” executive privilege norms). 
281 See KELLERMAN, supra note 44, at 226. 
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assertions of presidential power did not map well onto existing un-
derstandings of constitutional authority.282  Then came the 1980s.  
Unitary executive theory appeared, to make an unapologetic, even 
aggressive, case for President-centered government.  Presidential con-
trol over domestic policy and international affairs was elegantly and 
passionately shown to be not only the type of government Americans 
need in an increasingly dangerous world, but also the intended con-
stitutional order of things. 
Presidential behavior has not been the same since.  Armed with 
unitary executive theory, Presidents of both parties (even those care-
ful not to rely on its originalist constitutional reasoning) have gone 
on the offensive.  They and their advisers have claimed directory au-
thority over the people and the decisions involved in regulatory poli-
cymaking.  They have asserted the prerogative to collect, hold close, 
and act unilaterally upon the information needed to preserve the se-
curity of the nation and the safety of its citizens.  They have become 
hypervigilant to discover, and quick to protest against, perceived in-
cursions on their power by Congress, the courts and even private par-
ties.  Unitary executive theory has given Presidents a new sense of en-
titlement to get their way in leading the nation. 
As for the rest of us, unitary executive theory tells us a story we 
want to hear.  The democracy claim promises a representative uni-
quely fitted by constitutional design to extract from the Babel of 
modern democratic politics the essence of what we truly desire, and 
the nation truly needs.  The managerial claim promises that the Pres-
ident, if he can deploy all the powers the Constitution means him to 
have, will direct the process of national policymaking to fulfill these 
needs and desires.  The rapidly changing complexity, and the newly 
appreciated precariousness, of modern American life make the sim-
plicity, certainty, and assurance of this story deeply appealing.  At the 
same time, the extraordinary demands of governing a large, hetero-
geneous nation with an ambitious regulatory agenda and globally de-
fined interests make unitary executive theory’s promises impossible 
for any President to fulfill. 
My aim is not to suggest that some other government actor is bet-
ter suited to play the part of Representative and Manager-in-Chief, or 
 
282 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (rejecting authority of 
Executive officials to order warrantless domestic wiretapping for reasons of national secu-
rity); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting executive authority 
to enlist judicial process in forcing newspaper to suspend publication of classified infor-
mation); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (rejecting presi-
dential authority to seize private property in the absence of statutory authority). 
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to deny that the President has a unique, extensive, and central role to 
play in modern American government.  Rather, as I and others have 
argued elsewhere,283 the essential point is that no one institution of 
government is authorized, or able, to speak for the people and to 
manage singlehandedly the enterprise of contemporary regulatory 
government.  We must expect and challenge all the institutions of 
government—–Congress, the President, the courts, and agencies 
themselves—–to be part of an ongoing process through which de-
mocratic legitimacy is created and effective policy discovered, a proc-
ess that must seek new and more effective ways to inform and engage 
citizens.  A fundamental danger of unitary executive theory is that we 
will be lulled into thinking that this unwieldy, constant, and demand-
ing work need not be done, so long as we select the “right” person to 
be President. 
The other fundamental danger is that we will attribute excesses 
done in the name of unitary executive theory to the idiosyncratic fail-
ings of individuals, rather than recognizing them as intrinsic, largely 
uncontrollable risks of the theory itself.  What we saw from unitary 
executive leadership during the period of severe societal stress follow-
ing September 11 aligns disturbingly well with a pattern familiar to 
psychologists who study extremist groups and ideologies.284  Questions 
about the leader’s choices are constructed as attacks; disagreement is 
cast as disloyalty.285  The group’s authority structure becomes more 
suspicious and closed.286  No incipient challenge to the belief struc-
 
283 See Farina, supra note 7; Shane, Political Accountability, supra note 77; Peter L. Strauss, The 
Place of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. 
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SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 85–118, 160–76 (2007); Allen, supra note 285 
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ture is allowed to go uncontested.287  Any power the leader needs to 
meet the danger becomes his by right, for no ordinary rules can in-
terfere with the duty—which is his alone and outweighs all his other 
responsibilities—to preserve the group.288  It turns out that the quali-
ties of a group or belief system most effective at reducing the cogni-
tive and psychological stress of uncertainty are also the seeds of fa-
naticism.  Many of those sympathetic to unitary executive theory have 
been dismayed by its operationalization in the Bush Administration.  
They insist that President Bush and his advisers radicalized, even dis-
torted, the theory.289  But the unitary executive presidency of that 
Administration is recognizably the presidency of the literature that 
argues the constitutional and normative case for unitary executive 
theory.  The demands (and opportunities) of national crisis merely 
accelerated the trajectory of its development. 
Unitary executive theory is politically and culturally powerful be-
cause of its uncomplicated, unconditional certitude.  In the words of 
two prominent proponents, “The Constitution grants the President 
the authority to superintend the administration of federal law.  There 
are no caveats.  There are no exceptions.”290  Because of these same 
qualities, it is a philosophy for governing that contains no meaningful 
limits.  Particularly in the rapidly changing complexity, and newly ap-
preciated precariousness, of modern American life, this is comfort 
purchased at too dear a price. 
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